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ABSTRACT
This thesis evaluates the financial feasibility of a large-
scale luxury condominium development from a lender's
perspective and advises how a construction loan might be
structured to finance the project. The prospective
development is the first phase of ARCORP Properties, Inc.'s
long-range development plan for the 367-acre unimproved
parcel which it owns along the New Jersey bank of the Hudson
River. Development of the property poses a considerable
challenge given the site's lack of infrastructure, limited
vehicular access and isolated location.
Several key attributes drive the financial dynamics of the
project. First, because this is a large-scale development
on a difficult site, substantial infrastructure costs must
be incurred up-front. Second, the project's integrated
design and the need to establish a critical mass require
that a large stock of units be brought on the market in the
project's first phase. Third, competitive market conditions
in the waterfront region and the project's large scale will
restrain the rate of absorption and prices achieved at the
project in the short term.
The financial feasibility analysis indicates that ARCORP
will not be able to obtain a construction loan to finance
100% of the project's development costs simply by mortgaging
the 40-acre development parcel. Further, ARCORP will
probably have to invest a sizable amount of equity in the
project up-front, in addition to the land. ARCORP's return
from the project is assessed, and the author concludes that
it may be lower than is generally acceptable given the
degree of risk. ARCORP may take a longer-range view of -the
project, however, and consider it a means to enhance the
future profitability of the remainder of the site.
Thesis Supervisor: Lynne B. Sagalyn
Title: Assistant Professor of Planning and
Real Estate Development
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
ARCORP Properties, Inc. has a tremendous development
opportunity. It owns 367 contiguous acres along the west
bank of the Hudson River on which it plans to develop a
European-style "city" in the course of the next 20 to 30
years. The property is located in West New York and
Weehawken, New Jersey, directly opposite midtown Manhattan.
Initiating the transformation of the property into a lively
mixture of new housing, offices, shops, and parks poses a
considerable challenge, however, as the site is presently a
desolate scene of rotting piers and obsolete railyards.
Over the past two decades, the New Jersey Hudson River
waterfront has become a virtual wasteland. The previous
industrial and transportation activities ceased as economic
events altered the structures of the rail and shipping
industries. The waterfront, once a transportation hub for
industry, is virtually an island. It is bounded on the east
by the Hudson River and cut off from the communities to the
west by the Palisades Cliffs, with few east-west links and
without a continuous north-south roadway. ARCORP's property
consequently lacks adequate vehicular access and the
infrastructure necessary to support its prospective
development.
The entire development property is referred to as "Port
Imperial". The first stage of ARCORP's long-range mixed-use
development plan for the property is a large-scale luxury
6
condominium complex located on 40 acres at the northern end
of the site in West New York. This complex will contain
approximately 2,000 units, with structured parking for 2,902
cars and 60,000 gross square feet of retail space. The
purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the feasibility of
this proposed development from a construction lender's
perspective and to advise how a conventional construction
loan might be structured to finance the project. In
particular, this paper undertakes to explain how four key
factors drive the financial dynamics of the project:
First, the site itself imposes physical and marketing
constraints on the development owing to its unimproved
condition, limited access and isolation. As a result,
substantial infrastructure costs must be incurred up-front
to make the site developable and its location marketable.
Second, a large number of units (784) will be built in the
project's first phase in response to marketing and design
considerations. From a marketing perspective, ARCORP
believes it is necessary to establish a critical mass at the
site. Also, because of its symmetry and integration, the
project's design might appear awkward if fewer units were
built at once. This poses the financial risk, however, of
having to carry a large stock of unsold units. The
resultant pressure to sell units will in turn restrain the
prices achieved at the project in the short term. Third,
competition from other New Jersey waterfront projects and
the Manhattan condominium market will impact the absorption
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rate and prices that ARCORP's project can achieve. ARCORP
is not the only developer that is proposing to bring a large
supply of units on the market; other owners of waterfront
sites are planning to develop an unprecedented amount as
well. Moreover, condominium prices are expected to
depreciate in Manhattan as a result of recent overbuilding
there. Finally, ARCORP has obtained permission to operate a
ferry service between the site and midtown Manhattan. The
improved access to Manhattan via the ferry is the key to the
value that ARCORP has created for this property.
In the next chapter, an overview of the development
environment is presented which touches on the transition
that the waterfront region is undergoing. In particular,
the chapter assesses the development opportunities and
constraints of ARCORP's site and the strengths and
weaknesses of the development team which ARCORP has
assembled for the project. In addition, the political
environment of the Town of West New York is discussed as it
relates to several major issues that affect ARCORP's
development.
Chapter III describes the design concept of the
development, as the architecture is one of the project's
most distinctive features. The design is evaluated in terms
of what it implies about the construction, marketing and
phasing of the development.
A pro forma computer model was constructed to analyze
the economic viability of ARCORP's preliminary development
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program for the 40-acre parcel. The key attributes driving
the financial dynamics of the project and the major
assumptions underlying the computer model are discussed in
Chapter IV. The project's financial feasibility is then
evaluated from both a construction lender's and developer's
perspective. The main purpose of this before-tax
feasibility analysis is to investigate how a traditional
construction lender might structure a loan for this project.
The developer's return from the project is then assessed
under two loan scenarios.
The analysis indicates that ARCORP will not be able to
obtain a construction loan to cover 100% of the development
costs of the project, simply by mortgaging the 40 acres
which comprise the development parcel. Further, ARCORP is
likely to have to invest a sizable amount of equity into the
project up-front, in addition to the land. The author
concludes that ARCORP's return from this project may be
lower than is generally acceptable vis-a-vis the degree of
risk involved. However, ARCORP may not find this
objectionable if it expects the image established by this
project to enhance the returns in future stages of the
development of Port Imperial.
The final chapter identifies issues which ARCORP should
address before undertaking the proposed development.
Specifically, these issues will impact the financial
feasibility and marketability of the project.
Recommendations are made as to how to improve the viability
9
of this initial development project and how to implement
ARCORP's long-range development strategy for the entire
property.
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CHAPTER II
THE DEVELOPMENT ENVIRONMENT
The New Jersey Hudson River Waterfront
The New Jersey side of the Hudson River offers a unique
development opportunity; located within minutes of
Manhattan, it is one of the few parts of any major
metropolitan area that remains uninhabited and virtually
devoid of buildings. The previous industrial, rail and
shipping uses on the waterfront have been abandoned, for the
most part, over the past two decades. Many of the former
landowners went bankrupt with the advent of container
shipping and railroad deregulation, and acres of property
were tied up for years in bankruptcy court. Now, several
major national and local developers have acquired waterfront
sites and are drafting plans for large-scale, mixed-use
developments. Their plans, as of December 1985, amount to
23 million square feet of office space, 1.9 million square
feet of commercial space and 36,000 residential units, on a
shelf of land 18 miles long and less than a mile wide in
sections. Information about the current status and scope of
these major projects is provided in Figure 1.
The waterfront region includes eleven municipalities
within Bergen and Hudson Counties. Despite keen development
interest, no master plan exists for the region, nor is there
any organization to coordinate and assess the aggregate
impact of individual development plans. Cooperative,
comprehensive planning among the waterfront municipalities,
11
Figure 1
CURRENT STATUS AND SCOPE OF MAJOR
WATERFRONT DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS
N.Y. Times
New Jersey's
Changing Waterfront
Dani Ru Cor poration hwas Ofiooed a 53
unit apartment tJuil di id a iainra on
five acres at Par k Streut dnd River Road
Nathan Weissman. a developer. lias
begun work on 60 lownhouses at Snelter
Bay Club An aduining site is under
contract to James D Demetrakis. a For t
Lee lawyer who plans to build two
condominium buildings
___In Admirals Walk. near Route 5. American
3 Landmark Developers has completed two
11-story buildings containing 300
residential units.
Mr. Demetrakis has proposed Old Ferr y
Plaza. 540 high-rise and townhouse units
at Dempsey Avenue arid River Road.
Shorelne Associates has proposed two
five-sdr y buildings containing 150 units,
six townhouses and an 82-slip marina at
Garden Place and River Road
American Landmark Developers plans
700 apartments in a former Alcoa plant at
Russell Avenue and River Road
Marketplace Concepts plans to build 14
retail stores.
Edgewater Associates plans to convert a
Ford plant into 722 apartments and
proposes a mixed-use development.
Lever Brothers has converted a plant at
River Road and the Bergen County line
into a research and development facilityO Charles S Rocco Enterprises has begun
Roc Harbor. three 16-story towers arid 17
four-story residential buildings
Shelter Innovations plans a 255-unit
residential development and a marina
Prudential Insurance fompainy may build
a park m front of its Galaxy apartments
Arcorp Properties. which owns 300 acres
on the river, has a permit to build a marina
and is planning offices, townhouses.
apartments and retail space.OHatz M ountairn Industries has opened
4 Shanghai Red s Restaurant on a pier. It
owns 70 acres of a former container port
and is seeking a permit to develop a
140,000-square-foot office building. 250
to 300 residential units and a garage. I1
may build as many as two million square
feet of additional office space.
The former Bethlehem Steel shipyard was
15 sod recontly to a Hobokert developer
Anthony Dell'Aquila. He has not yet made
a formal proposal. but the site an
accommodate 1.600 residential units
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The Port Authority of New York and New5 Jersey plans to use three pier s aid 1 30
acres north of the Erie Lackawanna
Terminal for 1 00 housing units. 1 4
million square eet of otfice space.
150,000 square feet of retail space, a
400-room hotel. 750.000 square feet of
research and development space and
600 to 800 boat slips
'Glimcher / Simon/Lefrak has proposed
'Newport City on 270 acres near the
Holland Tunnel Proposals include more
than 9,000 dwelling units. 1.2 million
square'feet of retail space. 7.2 million
squpre feet of office space. 1.200 hotel
.rooms and 250 boat slips.
At Harsimus Cove, Daniel K. Ludwig, the
industrialist, has.proposed 1.500 housing
units and 750.000 square feet of office
and retail space on 95 acres
David M. Fromerand Michael W
Sonnenteldt are converting to office
space the two-million-square-foot
warehouse callud Harborside Terminal at
Ey change Place. near the PATH station.
Bankers T rust Company has taken
385,000 square feet. The developers
plan to build a 500-car garage. 125
dwelling units, a 300-room hotel and a
Jersey City will build a municipal park on
20 a pier at the foot of Exchange Place.
First Jersey National Corporation and
2 William D Schaffel. a developer. expect
to break ground in May for Exchange
Place Centre, a 30-story oftice tower and
fthe tallest building in New Jersey
Evergreen Marine Ltd , a container
shipping company. is completing a 1 7-
stor y office building on Washington Str Cet
that will be its headquar ters
Orn a 7 b-ac i u situ at Gr and Sir eet.
2 iender sorn Street and the Mor ris Caiial
Basin. Peter M Mocco has pr oposed
Liberty Har bor North, with 2.500 dwelling
units. 93.000 square feet of retail space
a hotel and e mar ina
At Liberty State Park. an 800-ai ret siteG that was a Ireight yard. the state plans to
build a museum and exhibition center
The Spoerry Group is building Port I
Liberte at Caven Point. which will include
1 .676 dwelling units. 740 boat blips, a
300-r oom hotel arid 46.000 square feet of
office space
The Port Authority has purchased a
former rail yar d as an industrial site
The Port Authority is seeking an
2 alternative use for Port Jersey. another of
its properties.
of transportation, parking and sewage disposal policies, is
necessary to accommodate the proposed level of development.
Failing to plan for development could actually prevent the
area from attracting as much as it is able to support.
Initial development could choke-off rather than stimulate
additional projects because of excessive traffic and a lack
of amenities. The need for a waterfront commission with
planning authority has been discussed in several public
forums. But the sensitivity of the local home rule
prerogative has precluded the State from responding to this
need.
Perhaps the most critical planning issue raised by the
prospective development is the traffic chaos that could
result. The area currently experiences heavy traffic
congestion associated with the Hudson River crossings. Any
successful waterfront transportation system must be able to
move people across the Hudson, over or through the
Palisades, and along the length of the waterfront. The New
Jersey Department of Transportation (NJDOT) and New Jersey
Transit Corporation (NJ Transit) are currently formulating a
phased waterfront transportation program, to which the State
has committed $800 million.2 The transportation program
will be based on State, local and private sector
coordination of four essential elements: road and highway
improvements, on-site parking restrictions, off-site parking
opportunities, a new mass transit system.3 The program's
basic strategy is to "catch" auto traffic at intercept
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parking areas west of the Palisades, then shuttle commuters
to and along the waterfront via mass transit - initially a
bus guideway system which eventually would be converted to a
light rail system. If properly planned, high-density urban
development of the waterfront offers a better chance of
solving traffic problems than low-density suburban-style
development, because only high-density development could
sustain an effective mass transit system.4
A market analysis was undertaken by a consultant to NJ
Transit, Real Estate Research Corporation, to project the
level of waterfront development that could be absorbed based
on market demand for housing, office and retail space within
the region. The results indicate that as much as 18.4
million square feet of office space, 1.75 million square
feet of retail space and 22,300 dwelling units could be
absorbed over the next fifteen years, provided that
transportation is not a serious impediment.5 Obviously, a
shake-out is destined to occur among the development
proposals now under consideration, based on relative
advantages of timing, location and project economics.
Site Attributes
ARCORP's property has the potential to become a major
development focal point on the Hudson River waterfront. The
367-acre site occupies 148 acres in West New York and 219
acres, to the south, in Weehawken, New Jersey, opposite a
stretch of Manhattan running from 35th to 74th Street. (See
Figure 2.) Close to a quarter of this acreage is actually
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land under water, for which ARCORP holds development rights.
The narrow, irregularly-shaped parcel extends for two miles
along the waterfront, and at its widest point is 1,900 feet
in width. The entire site is an uneven landfill, 20 to 180
feet deep over a base of bedrock and strewn with large
rocks. The property is bounded on the west by the Palisades
Cliffs which rise 160 feet. The communities are built atop
the cliffs overlooking the site, which is undeveloped except
for a warehouse that has been converted to ARCORP's office,
a 100-slip marina and some decaying piers.
ARCORP Properties, Inc. is the wholly-owned
subsidiary of A-P-A Transport, Corp., a highly successful,
New Jersey-based trucking company. Seeking to diversify his
company's activities, Arthur Imperatore, Chairman of A-P-A,
purchased the development property from Conrail in 1981 for
$7.75 million. He established ARCORP to oversee development
of this property, as well as an existing portfolio of
properties in New Jersey and New York. ARCORP's investment
in the property to date totals approximately $25 million
toward the purchase, site improvements and consulting, legal
and overhead expenses.6 Site improvements include the
removal of debris, unused buildings, railroad tracks, and
piers and the construction of a temporary north-south road
through the site and a 100-slip marina.
Access:
The site is 2,870 feet from Manhattan, "as the crow
flies". (See Figure 3.) It is approximately four-tenths of
16
Figure 3
ACCESS TO SITE
George W7shington Bridge
Lincoln Tunnel
Holland Tunnel
World Trade Center
Wall Street
Convention Center
Grand Central Station
Tunes Square
Empire State Building
Rockefeller Center
Lincoln Center
South Ferry
Meadowlands Sports Complex
Penn Station
Proposed Midtown Ferry Service
Projected Downtown Ferry Ser Z*
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a mile from the Lincoln Tunnel, two-and-a-half miles from
the PATH station in Hoboken and three miles from the Holland
Tunnel, yet it sorely lacks adequate, direct access to any
of these crossings. Vehicular access to the site is
restricted to three entranceways, all relatively inadequate
for the prospective development. At the northern end of the
site, there is direct access onto River Road, a twisting
two-to-three lane road that begins in Edgewater and runs
south, passing along the site's western edge before it bends
west and ends in West New York. Access via the southern end
is a narrow, winding, partially-paved right-of-way which
crosses unguarded railroad tracks and opens onto Boulevard
East at the approach to the Lincoln Tunnel. The third
access, Pershing Road, is at the center of the site. A two-
lane ramp, it is one of the few narrow ways down the
Palisades.
Perhaps the greatest potential for improved access is
that of an existing cut through the Palisades, the Weehawken
Tunnel, 4,200 feet long and 20 feet wide, which is currently
used by Conrail to run freight trains. Conrail is
considering vacating the tunnel, which could be bored out to
its full 34-foot right-of-way and used to run an east-west
light rail system from the waterfront to the meadowlands.
ARCORP has already purchased a north-south right-of-way from
Conrail which extends through the site and continues one
mile beyond the site's northern boundary. The northern-most
mile of this right-of-way effectively cuts off the
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waterfront from River Road. The owners of these "blocked"
waterfront parcels will have to negotiate easements with
ARCORP, in order to gain River Road access to their
respective sites.
Over the past five years, ARCORP has concentrated its
efforts on obtaining the requisite government approvals to
facilitate development of its site for commercial and
residential uses. Namely, ARCORP has sought permission to
operate a ferry service between the site and Manhattan and
zoning revisions that will allow high-density urban
development of the site. After eighteen months of lobbying,
ARCORP has obtained a permit to provide ferry service from
the site to an acre of waterfront property which it owns at
38th Street, near the new Jacob Javits Convention Center in
midtown Manhattan. (See Figure 3.) ARCORP is authorized,
as of May 1986, to transport hourly a maximum of 600
passengers in each direction, in up to four crossings per
hour, from 5 a.m. to 2 a.m. The crossing is reported to
take three minutes. ARCORP has already purchased for
approximately $800,000 one of the two high-speed, 77-foot
ferries that it intends to put into service. ARCORP also
anticipates obtaining a permit to provide ferry service to
downtown Manhattan at the South Ferry docks, a crossing
which reportedly takes eight minutes.
Zoning:
Over the next thirty years, the Imperatores plan to
build a European-style city with up to 15,000 residential
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units and 10 million square feet of commercial space on
their New Jersey waterfront property. A new zoning
ordinance for the Weehawken waterfront has been adopted,
which allows 13 million square feet of commercial and/or
residential development, subject to a maximum of 4,750
dwelling units and "view plane" height restrictions. In West
New York, a new ordinance is currently under review which
would permit a maximum of 50 dwelling units per acre and
limit commercial development to 35% of the gross area of the
waterfront district.
ARCORP has requested a proportionately equal amount of
density in both towns. The fundamental difference between
the proposed development in the two jurisdictions is that
ARCORP projects that the development in West New York will
be largely residential, with only 20% commercial. Within the
Weehawken boundaries, the site opposite the Weehawken Tunnel
at the center of the property is deemed to be the best
location for commercial development and a main ferry
terminal.
The first phase of ARCORP's long-range development plan
is a luxury condominium complex located at the northern end
of the property in West New York. The northern end of the
site presently has the best vehicular access via River Road,
which is in need of less improvement than the other
entranceways to the site. ARCORP has decided to develop a
residential project first, because it believes that
residential development is a more effective catalyst than
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commercial for generating activity and establishing a
favorable presence at the site. Another factor in the
decision to develop the northern end first is the existence
of a residential high-rise complex in the immediate
vicinity. This project, the Galaxy Towers located atop the
Palisades in Guttenberg, has established a successful
residential presence in a locale that was predominantly
industrial in character.
The first-phase development parcel consists of
approximately forty acres, twenty-five acres upland and
fifteen under water. Under the provisions of the proposed
West New York ordinance, fifty dwelling units per acre,
calculated on the basis of the entire parcel, may be
developed. Thus, ARCORP could potentially develop up to
approximately 2,000 units on the parcel. The development may
be contained on the upland portion of the site or extend
into the water. Normally, the construction of over-water
platforms would require a special permit, despite the
provisions of the proposed zoning ordinance. However,
ARCORP may replace as-of-right any existing piers with an
equivalent area of new over-water platforms, at any location
behind the bulkhead line. As part of its New York Harbor
Clean-Up Project, the Army Corps of Engineers has been
removing rotting piers, piles and bulkheads on ARCORP's
site, at no cost to ARCORP.
The program for the luxury condominium complex of 2,000
units consists of approximately 2,979,000 gross square feet
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of residential space with a net saleable area of 2,413,770
square feet. The project will contain approximately 60,000
gross square feet of commercial space, 41,000 of which will
be located in a seperate structure. The remaining 19,000
square feet will be distributed among the ground floors of
three of the residential buildings. A 2,902-car parking
structure, containing approximately 870,600 gross square
feet, will be constructed along the back of the complex.
The entire complex will be lavishly landscaped, including a
waterfront esplanade, a piazza, reflecting pools, and formal
walkway network.
Development Opportunities and Constraints:
The site presents overwhelming development
opportunities. The low land cost, $7.75 million or
approximately $21,000 per acre, should allow ARCORP's
development to absorb the high site preparation costs of
roads and infrastructure. The tremendous value created via
the zoning revisions alone has increased ARCORP's equity in
the property dramatically. (The property has been valued
independently at as much as $400 million.)
The site is one of the largest and most conveniently
located sites on the waterfront. Its large scale affords
ARCORP the opportunity to control the environment of the
project and to create a favorable setting. The location
also facilitates several immediate and long-term solutions
to present transportation problems. Two important rights-
of-way traverse the site, the one running north-south
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through the site which ARCORP owns and the other running
east-west through the Palisades via the Weehawken Tunnel
which ARCORP is negotiating to purchase from Conrail. These
rights-of-way may be utilized to create an express bus
commuter link between the waterfront and northern New Jersey
suburbs. This bus service could eventually be upgraded to a
light rail system, as development of the waterfront
progresses. (See Figures 4A-C.) Because of its size and
the paths of the rights-of-way, the site is an integral part
of NJDOT's mass transit plan for the region. ARCORP's
control of the north-south right-of-way improves its
negotiating position with NJDOT regarding the transportation
plan and exactions of land and cash from ARCORP to support
the plan.
By far the most outstanding feature of ARCORP's
development scheme is the planned ferry service between Port
Imperial and Manhattan. The ferry facilitates faster
accessibility to midtown and downtown Manhattan from the
site than from some prime residential locations in
Manhattan. The ferry service combined with the property's
setting provide a unique residential location for the
development's first phase. The exceptional features of this
setting include magnificent views of Manhattan and the
waterfront amenities. Further, the seclusion provided by
the Palisades will allow the development to establish an
identity distinct from the adjacent communities.
The site's isolation is also a drawback, however.
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Figure 4A
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Figure 4B
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Figure 4C
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Access to the site is limited. The three existing access
routes do not provide adequate means to support the level of
traffic that the development will generate. Virtually no
infrastructure exists at the site. Besides on and off-site
road improvements, all utilities (water, sewer, electric,
gas, telephone) must be brought to the site. The proximity
of existing utility connections will be known once a survey
of the site, currently underway, is completed. In order to
attract people to live at the site, there must also exist a
retail "infrastructure" composed of convenience services
such as food, pharmacy and drycleaning establishments, as
well as restaurants.
Other constraints on the development of the site
include physical and regulatory factors. The site's
waterfront location and poor soil conditions will
necessitate additional expenditures for bulkheads,
platforming, landfill, and special foundations. The area
surrounding the site currently experiences heavy traffic
congestion associated with the Hudson River crossings.
Since area roads are already at or near capacity, successful
development of the site, over the long term, will depend
upon the implementation of a regional mass transit plan.
The site's location on the waterfront also makes the
development subject to a lengthy and rigorous review and
approval process involving federal, state, county, and
municipal agencies. Legislation enacted by the New Jersey
Department of Environmental Protection mandates the
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incorporation of a continuous public walkway in the design
of all projects located along the region's waterfront. This
poses a problem for ARCORP in reconciling public access with
a secure and exclusive marketing image for its project.
West New York Political Environment
The most densely populated municipality in Hudson
County, the Town of West New York is one of the most densely
populated urban areas in the country. Occupying roughly one
square mile, the Town has a population of approximately
42,000. Hudson County has a very high concentration of
minority groups. West New York and neighboring Union City,
in particular, have a very high proportion of Hispanics,
primarily of Cuban origin, who represent 63% and 64% of
their populations, respectively.8
Hudson County is the third poorest of the 21 counties
in New Jersey as measured by median household income.
Similarly, the County has a disproportionate share of low
(less than 50% of the State median household income) and
moderate-income households (between 50% and 80% of the
Statewide median) as compared to the State as a whole.9 The
1980 U.S. Census reported that low and moderate income
households comprised 40% and 19%, respectively, of all West
New York households. The problems of high unemployment and
the loss of jobs to outlying suburban areas are also readily
apparent in Hudson County. The unemployment rate in West
New York was 12.1% in 1983, in contrast to the Statewide
rate of 7.8%. Despite the steady increase in the number of
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jobs in the State from 1974 to 1984, West New York
experienced an 18% decrease in jobs over that period. 1 0
As in most densely populated urban areas, Hudson
County's housing stock consists primarily of multi-family,
renter-occupied housing units. West New York's housing
stock consists of 91% multi-family and 80% renter-occupied
units, with 15% of the housing units classified as
substandard.1 1 Accordingly, West New York receives federal
funds for publicly-subsidized housing, as do nearly all of
the Hudson County communities. Further, under State
guidelines, West New York is one of seven of the twelve
Hudson County communities that are designated as "Urban Aid"
municipalities. As such, it receives State aid for the
maintenance, improvement and upgrading of municipal
services. 1 2
Despite these dim circumstances, recent trends indicate
that Hudson County stands to benefit from a new wave of
revitalization, given its close proximity to Manhattan and
the resounding growth of the New York City economy over the
past decade. The notable increase in jobs in Manhattan,
particularly in the financial services sector, has in turn
spurred demand in New Jersey for housing and back-office
space, which are convenient to Manhattan yet relatively more
affordable. Development pressure began to intensify first
in Hoboken and Jersey City nearly a decade ago. Both
communities are undergoing a renaissance in terms of
residential and commercial redevelopment, particularly along
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the waterfront. However, this has not been the case in West
New York and most other municipalities in Hudson County,
which have lagged behind the two leaders in the
revitalization effort.
Lengthy bankruptcy procedures involving the former
landowner, the Penn Central Railroad, forestalled
development of the West New York waterfront. Now ARCORP
controls the entire waterfront in West New York; its site
occupies approximately one third of the total area of the
Town. Under the site's present zoning, low-density,
suburban-style residential development is allowed: 20
dwelling units per acre, maximum height of 32 feet, minimum
open space of 30% of the upland area. In view of the sizable
physical constraints on development of the site, the lack of
infrastructure and poor soil conditions, ARCORP could not
economically develop the site at such a low density.
ARCORP's approach to obtaining a rezoning of the site
displays two interesting elements of strategy.
Edward Imperatore, General Manager of ARCORP and Arthur
Imperatore's nephew, has personally led the rezoning effort.
His first strategic decision was to pursue a change in the
zoning ordinance for the waterfront area, rather than to
request a variance, by demonstrating that a higher density
was imperative to make development of the site feasible.
ARCORP has submitted a draft ordinance to West New York that
proposes a density of 50 units per acre, a maximum height of
160 feet (the height of the Palisades), and an open space
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requirement of 20% of the overall development area
(including land under water). Under the proposed ordinance,
commercial and light industrial uses may occupy no more than
35% of the gross area of the site.
If successful, obtaining the zoning revision via this
approach would afford ARCORP two advantages. Development of
the site would become as-of-right. Also, approval of the
higher density provisions would not be subject to
simultaneous approval of a site plan for the proposed
development, as is required in a variance request. ARCORP
did not have a site plan to present at the time it submitted
the ordinance; nonetheless, it probably was wise not to
present prematurely one that would be subject to change.
Moreover, a site plan could have diverted the discussion
from the subject of economic feasibility to design
aesthetics, possibly to the detriment of ARCORP.
One might expect the citizens and officials of West New
York to be eagerly awaiting the economic development that
would presumably result from ARCORP's waterfront project.
Instead, the Town's attitude toward ARCORP's proposal is
reserved, even apprehensive. The majority of the
population, the Hispanic community, apparently is not
organized, for not one member has appeared at a Town meeting
to discuss the project.13 The only constituency to have
voiced its opinion is a small, vocal, upper-income group
which is in opposition to the proposed ordinance. This
group consists of residents of three high-rise developments
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located atop the Palisades in West New York, who are
concerned with preserving their view of Manhattan and fear
that their property values will fall because of competition
from ARCORP's project.
The major credible issue of public concern regarding
ARCORP's prospective development is that which has been
raised by Town officials. Namely, concern exists that
ARCORP's development might impose a fiscal drain on the Town
owing to the expansion of essential services such as police
and fire protection, street repair, garbage collection,
etc., notwithstanding the large increase in tax rateables
that is projected to result. In response to this concern,
ARCORP has made a rather daring strategic move. To ensure
that the Town will not face unforeseeable costs as a result
of its development, ARCORP has proposed to privatize the
provision of municipal services to the extent possible by
law. This includes the construction, repair and maintenance
of its project's roads, on-site garbage collection, the
provision of most security, fire protection and emergency
services, and the payment of its pro rata share of the cost
to upgrade the Town's sewage treatment facility. Only
administrative, educational and occasional emergency
services would have to be provided by the Town.14
ARCORP commissioned Doctors Robert Burchell and David
Listokin to prepare a report on the fiscal impact of the
ARCORP development on West New York. The report was written
on the assumption that ARCORP's development property would
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be entitled to some form of tax abatement in exchange for
the rateable base addition of the development, as well as
the privatization of municipal services. The report
findings indicate that by 1991, West New York would
experience a 25% expansion of its current tax base and a 14%
reduction of its current tax rate (provided current fiscal
policies continue), notwithstanding a tax abatement. In
addition, the report projects that without ARCORP's
development, West New York would experience a cumulative
fiscal deficit of $0.9 million by 1991.
ARCORP submitted its draft ordinance to West New York
in the summer of 1985. Officially, the Mayor must formally
present the ordinance to the Planning Board, whose vote is
then subject to approval by the Mayor and Board of
Commissioners. West New York's Mayor and Commissioners are
part-time elected officials. Members of the Planning Board
are appointed by the Mayor, who also holds a place on the
Board. Mayor Anthony DeFino not only "officially" wields
substantial power in West New York, he indeed "unofficially"
runs the show in that Town.15 His domineering style and
large physical size have made him quite a political
personality. Oddly enough, however, he has behaved
indecisively regarding the rezoning issue. He hedged for a
year before finally introducing the ordinance to the
Planning Board in July 1986.
The Planning Board has recommended approval of the
ordinance, which is now subject to the vote of the
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Commissioners and the Mayor. Final approval is viewed as
practically certain.16 Nevertheless, Mayor DeFino may
have already jeopardized his reelection in 1987, for his
opponents can construe his sluggish behavior on this matter
as weak leadership. Notwithstanding the rezoning issue, his
reelection prospects are dubious. Mayor DeFino is the
quintessential liberal, "big-government" Democrat, whose
ideology differs from that of the Cuban majority in West New
York. The Cuban community, for the most part, is
conservative, pro-business, and suspicious of "big
government"-style politics.17 That West New York is
susceptible to conservative Republican inroads is evident
from the recent mayoral elections in neighboring Weehawken
and Union City. A Republican, Iacone, and a conservative
Cuban Democrat, Menendez, are presently the Mayors of
Weehawken and Union City, respectively. Menendez, in
particular, is an opponent of DeFino and could be
instrumental in placing another conservative Cuban Democrat
against DeFino in the 1987 race.
Edward Imperatore has developed a good rapport with the
DeFino administration. Should DeFino not be reelected and
ARCORP have to negotiate with a new cast of characters, the
project could incur additional risk and delays. From
ARCORP's perspective, the rezoning is the first of three
major issues to be resolved with the Town which will
significantly affect its development plans. ARCORP has
barely begun to discuss the other two subjects with the
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Town, tax abatement and the upgrading of the West New York
sewage treatment facility. It is doubtful that these issues
will be resolved in a more expeditious manner than that in
which the rezoning has been handled.
West New York's real estate tax rate is comparatively
high within Hudson County, largely because of the high
percentage of low income households and corresponding low
property values. While the tax rate is high, $112.22 per
$1,000 assessed valuation, assessments are fairly low at
about 48.5 percent of true local value.18 Still, the annual
tax expense on a $200,000 house is sizable, almost $11,000
at the current assessment ratio. This presents a marketing
obstacle to ARCORP's condominium project. To realize higher
sales prices, ARCORP must lower the cost of living at its
project vis-a-vis other New Jersey waterfront projects. The
high property tax rate would negate the income and excise
tax advantages vis-a-vis New York as well, thereby reducing
ARCORP's competitiveness with Manhattan projects. Under a
State law, specifically known as Fox-Lance, New Jersey
municipalities are permitted to designate vacant lands as
blighted for the purpose of exacting reduced payments in
lieu of taxes. 19 Edward Imperatore has requested that West
New York use its powers to abate the taxes on ARCORP's
waterfront property, in view of both the favorable projected
fiscal impact of the development's tax base addition and the
privatization of municipal services.
West New York's sewage treatment plant is presently
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operating at near capacity with only primary treatment
capability. The State has issued a decree that all
municipalities must have secondary sewage treatment capacity
by July 1988.20 Obviously, the requisite capacity in West
New York will be greater with ARCORP's development.
Although building permits may be issued for new development
projects, certificates of occupancy probably would not be,
if this deadline is not met. ARCORP has proposed to bear
its pro rata share of the cost to upgrade the West New York
plant, which currently pumps waste through ARCORP's site
into the Hudson River. A thorough analysis of the scope and
costs of upgrading the facility has not been conducted. The
discussion to date of means of structuring a financial
package to upgrade the plant has been very general. The
favored method seems to be a municipal bond issue, under
whose terms ARCORP would service its pro rata share via
hook-up fees paid on a per-unit-occupied basis. Whether or
not ARCORP would be required to contribute capital up-front
to finance the plant improvements has not been ruled out.
The implications for ARCORP's development of the financing
and timing of the plant improvements are serious, yet
unclear at present.
Once the rezoning is achieved, ARCORP must file a site
plan for the first phase of its development to initiate the
design approval and permitting process at the municipal
level. The State and County both also play a direct role in
the review and approval process. The New Jersey Department
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of Environmental Protection (DEP) has legislated the only
requirement to date that is applicable to the entire
waterfront region, that is there must be a continuous public
walkway along the waterfront incorporated in the design of
every development. What constitutes acceptable public
access, however, is left up to the respective municipalities
at present. The DEP is also charged with reviewing plans
and issuing permits for new development within 500 feet of
the river. Final preparation of an Environmental Impact
Report is underway, as required under Federal Law, for
submission to the State DEP. A draft report has already been
reviewed and commented upon favorably by the DEP. As for
Hudson County, it has water and sewer master plans which
will have direct ramifications for ARCORP's development.
Given the numerous parties and issues involved in the review
and approval process for this development, ARCORP's
tentative schedule to break-ground by March 1987 is very
ambitious.
The Development Team
Backed by A-P-A Transport, ARCORP has a strong
financial position; however, the organization lacks real
estate development experience. Its inexperience is even
more striking when one considers the scale and complexity of
the proposed first phase of the Port Imperial development.
Arthur Imperatore has been the primary inspiration behind
the grandiose development plans for Port Imperial. In his
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early sixties, Mr. Imperatore is a very successful and
determined self-made business man. He owns over 90 percent
of the stock in A-P-A, and his total fortune is said to
approach $200 million.21 A-P-A, founded by Mr. Imperatore
and his brothers forty years ago, consistently outperforms
its competitors in the trucking industry. For the past
decade, A-P-A's profit margin has been first or second,
although it ranks only fifty-eighth in terms of revenue.
Compared with an industry average of five cents, A-P-A
earned an astonishing seventeen cents on every dollar in
1983. 22
Beginning in the 1970's, Arthur Imperatore has overseen
the assemblage of an impressive portfolio of real estate
holdings in New York and New Jersey. These are owned
principally by ARCORP, which operates under the name of
Palatine Realty Corp. in New York. The organization's
previous real estate development experience is limited to a
condominium development in 1982, the 76-unit Cliffhouse in
Cliffside Park, New Jersey, which was unsuccessful largely
because of ineffective marketing and high carrying costs.
The project was marketed by local brokers working on a
commission basis. Consequently, these brokers were as eager
to sell a house or a unit in a competing development as in
Cliffhouse, simply to earn their sales commissions.
Cliffhouse units finally began to sell once a consultant and
his sales force were retained on-site on a full-time salary
and commission basis. For the Port Imperial residential
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development, the marketing strategy is to form an in-house
sales staff, rather than utilize an outside consultant or
brokerage firm.
Among other properties held by ARCORP, via Palatine,
are two important sites in midtown Manhattan. Directly east
of the new Jacob Javit's Convention Center at Eleventh
Avenue and 36th Street, Palatine is undertaking the
development of a hotel, residential and parking complex.
The development is a joint venture of Palatine and two
experienced developer partners. Palatine also proposes to
develop, under a similar joint venture arrangement,
approximately three million square feet of office space on a
25-acre site which it controls along the waterfront between
35th and 41st Streets.
ARCORP is staffed by a small number of people. Given
the organization's extensive development plans, this limited
staff may be strained and therefore inadequate in managing
development of this volume and complexity. ARCORP appears
to have acknowledged these shortcomings by structuring joint
ventures with experienced developers to initiate development
of its properties.
ARCORP is in the process of negotiating a participation
agreement with an experienced residential developer, Forest
City Dillon, Inc. (FCD), for the purpose of developing the
residential complex at Port Imperial. FCD is a Cleveland-
based public company that was founded in the 1920's by the
Rattner family, whose members still hold key positions in
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the firm. It has developed and constructed over 40,000
residential units throughout the United States. FCD's
expertise is modular construction, utilizing prefabricated
components which it manufactures. The FCD components and
building method, which are described in Chapter III, will
most likely be utilized in the construction of ARCORP's
project.
Although the terms of the agreement have not been
disclosed, it appears that FCD will be an equal participant
in all financing, marketing, design, and construction
decisions relating to the project. FCD will not, however,
have a direct ownership stake in the property. FCD instead
will receive an equity kicker, or share of the profits, in
exchange for the contribution of its development expertise,
commonly referred to as "sweat equity". The joint venture
may retain FCD to act as general contractor (or construction
manager) for the project; however, this is not a requirement
of the pending agreement. The manner in which ARCORP's in-
house construction staff would interact with FCD under such
an arrangement is unclear.
FCD's track record no doubt will enhance the
creditworthiness of the project. However, FCD has limited
construction experience in the New York metropolitan area.
Familiarity with local subcontractors, unions, building
codes, and trade jurisdictions and practises is essential to
managing a project of this scope, particularly as it will
involve prefabricated construction. In this respect,
40
ARCORP's Director of Construction, Louis Newman, is a
tremendous resource. Mr. Newman recently joined ARCORP to
oversee its newly formed construction department. He has
over thirty-five years of construction experience in the New
York area and has been a senior member of some of the
construction industry's foremost organizations.
Another key member of the development team is the
architect of the residential complex, Ricardo Bofill.
Bofill is a Spaniard whose large-scale residential projects
in Spain and France are well-known throughout the world.
The Port Imperial project is his first commission in the
United States. This poses a potential logistic problem.
Bofill's design drawings must be converted to working
drawings that are intelligible by American contractors.
ARCORP considered hiring an American architectural firm to
do the working drawings. Instead, however, ARCORP is
proceeding with construction of an on-site studio, adjacent
to its office, in which a team of European draftsmen
directed by Bofill will prepare the working drawings.
Apparently, Bofill will manage the entire design process.
It is important that ARCORP's construction staff work
closely with Bofill's team to ensure that the drawings are
done in accordance with local standards. It is also
advisable for ARCORP to retain an American inspecting
architect to monitor construction of the project.
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CHAPTER III
DESIGN CONCEPT
It is the express desire of Arthur Imperatore that
ARCORP's residential development evoke an image of European
grandeur and classical elegance. His overriding concern is
to establish an acclaimed presence in the region through the
originality and quality of his project's design. This
project is the first phase in ARCORP's long-range plan to
develop a beautiful and exciting waterfront "city", in
effect, on the 367-acre site. The high density and large
scale of Phase I are deemed necessary first, to balance the
high site improvement costs and second, to generate a level
of activity and vitality, i.e. a critical mass, which will
enhance the site's attraction for future commercial tenants
and residents.
Arthur Imperatore's taste for continental architecture
and interior design led him to Europe, where he admired the
work of well-known Spanish architect, Ricardo Bofill.
Bofill has designed several large-scale multi-family
complexes in Spain and France. He has gained notoriety for
what he proclaims to be his "castles for the working man",
affordable housing projects of prefabricated construction
whose facades are embellished with neo-classical motifs.
(e.g. Walden 7 in Barcelona, Spain 1974) Typically
monumental in scale, his designs are almost sculptural owing
to the heavy massing and tightly integrated components.
(e.g. Barrio Gaudi in Reus, France 1985)
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Ricardo Bofill's response to Arthur Imperatore's
request is indeed a bold and monumental neo-classical
design. The name given the complex, "The Palace", relates
to the grand proportions, ornamental facades and formal open
spaces of the plan. The facades will be marble with
decorative precast columns1 and continuous vertical bands of
glass, crossed by horizontal bands of glass at every fourth
floor. The focus of Bofill's symmetrical master plan
consists of four crescent structures which are arranged in
pairs and aligned parallel to the waterfront. The crescents
within each pair are turned inward slightly and linked by an
arch. Each of these arches faces another arch, located at
the ends of the respective outer crescents. The two inner
crescents are linked by a central arch through which a one-
story structure, containing approximately 41,000 square feet
of retail and ferry terminal space, extends into the river.
(See Figures 5A-B.)
Along the back of the project and at the edge of the
Palisades, is a four-level parking structure with one level
below grade. The upper three levels will be terraced to
meet the slope of the Palisades, then covered with an earth
berm, to appear to have been built into the side of the
cliffs. This method of construction is expensive and will
require ventilation. The poor soil conditions prohibit
building underground parking beneath the crescents. At
either end and at a break in the center of the parking
structure rise three towers. The center tower contains
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approximately 9,000 square feet of retail space on the
ground floor. Located between the center tower and the one-
story retail structure is a piazza through which a four-lane
boulevard passes parallel to the crescents. A 1,600-slip
marina is planned that is bounded by two viaduct structures,
each designed with double arches that are perpendicular to
the shore. All of the structures, the crescents, arches,
towers, and viaducts, are sixteen stories high. The
archways are twelve stories high. (i.e. The legs of each
arch are twelve stories and the bridge across the top is
four stories.)
The program for the master plan has not been firmly
defined, in terms of the gross and net square footage of the
buildings or the unit mix. Neither has a phasing schedule
been firmly established. The program in Table 1 is based on
Bofill's June 1986 presentation to ARCORP. A residential
efficiency ratio (net to gross square feet) of 81% is
assumed. No residential units will be located on the ground
floors of the buildings. The ground floors will contain
circulation, storage and mechanical space. However, the
ground floors in the two mid-crescents and central tower
will contain some retail space.
All of the structures will be built on piles, without
basements, since the site is a landfill with a high water-
table. The viaduct structures in all likelihood will not be
built, as they would block the view from the outer
crescents. However, ARCORP wants to protect its development
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Port Imperial
West New York, New Jersey
Table 1 DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM BY PHASE
TOTAL RSDNTL # OF AVG UNIT # PKING CUM. PKING
GSF NSF UNITS SI2E SPACES RATIO
PHASE ONE:
N-Mid Crescent*
S-Mid Crescent*
Central Arch
Retail
Subtotal
PHASE TWO:
South Crescent
& Two Arches
Cum. Subtotal
PHASE THREE:
North Crescent
& Two Arches
Cum. Subtotal
PHASE FOUR:
Three Towers**
TOTAL:
557,000
557,000
103,000
41,000
451,170
451,170
83,430
364
364
56
1,240
1,240
1,490
668
780
1,258,000 985,770 784 1,260 1,448 1.85
714,500 579,000 474 1,220 806
1,972,500 1,564,770 1,258 1,245 2,254 1.80
714,500 579,000 474 1,220 648
2,687,000 2,143,770 1,732 1,240 2,902 1.70
333,000 270,000 270 1,000 0
3,020,0O0 2,413,770 2,002 1,205 2,902 1.45
*CEach contains 5,000 gsf of retail.)
**CCenter Tower contains 9,000 gzf of retail.)
***(Master plan also includes two viaduct structures,
each containing 319,000 gsf, 258,500 nsf and 196 units.)
rights associated with the adjacent land under water. To
do so, ARCORP may have to grant a negative easement to the
future condominium owners' association, to ensure that it
will not develop any structures that would obstruct the view
from the Palace.2
The retail and landscaping portion of the program and
the project amenities are sketchy at present. originally,
Bofill's program included 50,000 gross square feet of retail
space: 41,000 square feet located in the one-story
structure which extends through the central arch, and 9,000
square feet in the ground floor of the central tower.
ARCORP's marketing consultant, Fred VanderKloot, reports
that the project will contain 60,000 gross square feet of
retail space, 3 owing to the provision of 5,000 square feet
of retail space on the ground floor of each of the mid-
crescents. Based on an efficiency ratio of 80%, there will
be 48,000 rentable square feet of retail space. The
proposed tenant mix includes:
30,000 gsf Retail facilities
10,000 gsf Health Club
10,000 gsf Restaurants
5,000 gsf Theatres
3,000 gsf Commercial office
2,000 gsf Ferry terminal
60,000 gsf
The interior plan of the crescent structures, referred
to by Bofill as the Vertical Articulation Module, consists
of vertical blocks of units that are laterally juxtaposed.
The respective vertical blocks are essentially self-
contained; no interior corridors exist to link adjoining
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blocks above the ground floor. Each block contains
approximately three to five units per floor and has a
separate service core and interior entrance. There are
eight cores within each crescent. Access to each crescent
is limited to one central entrance along the outer edge of
each building. Within each, the central lobby leads into a
glass-enclosed corridor, which runs along the crescent's
inner edge at the ground level. This corridor links the
private lobbies of the respective vertical blocks and
overlooks the crescent's formal, landscaped inner court.
Two of the crescents are designed to have inner courts that
are virtually filled by large reflecting pools.
The design concept has both positive and negative
implications for the construction and marketing of the
project. The interior plan facilitates floor-through
layouts in most of the units, thereby taking maximum
advantage of the view of Manhattan from the site. In
contrast, a double-loaded corridor plan would have forfeited
the view from half the units. A drawback is the
considerable added expense of multiple cores, compounded by
the fact that each core will contain two elevators. Focus
Group studies directed by ARCORP's marketing consultant
indicated that buyers expect dual elevator service in luxury
buildings. A convential building containing this many units
normally would have about six elevators in a central
bank.4
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Construction Implications:
The Vertical Articulation Module plan is integrally
related to the proposed Forest City Dillon (FCD) building
method: an on-site erection and assembly procedure
utilizing precast components as forms for poured-in-place
concrete which completes the structural connection.5 The
four major subsystems of the FCD method are: the structural
components, the service core, the elevator component, the
non-load bearing wall package.
The FCD method eliminates the problems of conventional
precast "jointing" by using site-poured concrete. The
bearing walls are cast in steel beds which utilize special
edge forms, allowing the placement of rectangular mandrels
at regular intervals along the length of the walls. During
the curing process, the mandrels are removed, creating voids
which run the full height of the wall. On-site, the voids
are reinforced with steel rods and filled with concrete to
form the structural joint. FCD floor slabs are usually
eight feet wide and up to 28 feet long, at a standard
thickness of four or eight inches. The top surface of the
four-inch slabs are roughened and are topped with four more
inches of concrete during erection. The top surfaces of the
eight-inch slabs are smooth. These slabs create the edge
form for pouring the topping on the four-inch slabs, thus
eliminating the necessity for on-site form work. To finish
the floor at the exterior of a living unit, an eight-inch
floor slab or spandrel panel is utilized. This component
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can serve as both floor and facade and is the edge form for
the site-poured concrete, integrating the unit's floor
slabs.6
The service core components are 90% finished before
delivery.7 This core is fabricated on an eight-inch thick
pre-stressed floor slab that becomes part of the buildings
structural floor system. Thus, the service cores are
installed floor-by-floor, in sequence with the building's
erection. The core is composed of various combinations of
kitchens and bathrooms, according to the building's design
specifications. It is completed in-plant with all
electrical connections, plumbing and other specified
equipment, in accordance with applicable local building
codes. The service core contains all fixtures and
appliances and reportedly can range in finish from budget to
luxury class.8 Other building materials are packed with the
service core, such as the curtain wall, partition walls,
interior doors, and drywall, so that when the service core
is lifted into place at the building site, workmen have the
materials needed. As a result, interior areas are 60%
completed at "topping-out".9
The FCD elevator shaft components are installed floor-
by-floor, in sequence with the building's erection in the
same way as the other structural components. Each module
has all necessary openings, inserts and block-outs so that
doors and equipment can be installed immediately. The
elevator is operational soon after topping-out, which
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further expedites finishing work inside the building.
Since the FCD method locates most labor-intensive
stages of construction in the factory, such as forming and
interior utility and finishing work, it can save months of
erection time. Also, because the FCD method is designed to
ensure that on-site workers have the materials they need
when they need them, time-consuming delays are avoided and
on-site labor productivity is increased. As erection of the
building proceeds at the rate of two floors every week,
tradesmen are at work on the floors below, making field
connections in the service cores, completing floor-to-floor
plumbing and wiring, and installing interior walls and
drywall.10 Moreover, after topping-out the building is just
three to four months from occupancy, as compared to seven or
more months with conventional construction. The FCD method
is estimated to reduce conventional construction time for a
multi-story apartment or hotel by up to 50% (eight months
versus fifteen). This enables much earlier occupancy and
reduces the interest paid on an outstanding construction
loan.
The major advantage of this method for ARCORP's Palace
development is that it will reduce construction time and
activity on-site, thereby mitigating the disturbance of
earlier-phase residents caused by the construction of
subsequent phases. This method also is considered by some
to be better adapted to construction of a circular building
than conventional construction. There are potential
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disadvantages associated with this method, however. Trade
unions are generally resentful of prefabricated construction
methods that displace their members. Yet the cooperation of
the unions is essential to completing the on-site erection
and assembly processes in the FCD method. ARCORP claims to
have excellent union relations in New Jersey through A-P-A's
dealings with the Teamsters. However, it remains to be seen
whether there is solidarity between the Teamsters, with whom
A-P-A has strong ties, and the various construction unions.
Secondly, there is a prevailing market bias against
prefabricated residential construction in the United States.
ARCORP will have to overcome this through sophisticated
marketing and high-level quality-control of the component
manufacturing process.
Marketing Implications:
This building method affords less marketing flexibility
than conventional methods. The floor plans within a
vertical block are interdependent on the locations of the
bearing walls and the wet cores. As such, successive floor
plans within a block may vary only slightly. For instance,
if ARCORP wanted to include some studio apartments within a
block, it would virtually have to have a studio in the same
location on every floor, given the floor plan constraints. 12
Bofill has designed sixteen different floor plans or "core
arrangements".13 Each vertical module may contain one core
arrangement, that is the same basic floor plan repeated on
successive floors. Each of the sixteen core arrangements
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can accommodate three to five apartments per floor.
The logistics of this method further limit the
project's marketing flexibility. To achieve the projected
economies of time, the "order" for wet core modules must be
placed with the manufacturer early in the planning and
design stage. (Forest City Dillon requires five months lead
time.) The schedule of production and installation of the
wet core modules is dependent upon the specified unit mix
(i.e. the types and locations of units). The costs of
modifying the unit mix or layout of a particular core are
prohibitive once production of the wet cores is underway.
Once production is underway, a revision of the original wet
core specifications (e.g. bathroom/bathroom or
bathroom/kitchen) would disrupt the manufacturer's
production process. Not only would this cause a delay, the
manufacturer would most likely impose a penalty fee as well.
The developer, therefore, essentially must commit to a
designated unit mix in the planning and design phase. In
double-loaded corridor buildings with conventional
construction, interior partitions may be altered to modify
layouts once construction is underway for a relatively minor
cost premium. Thus, a developer may respond more flexibly
to the preferences of the market by increasing the number of
more popular units. As all vertical modules within a
structure are constructed simultaneously, not sequentially,
revision of the unit mix of the entire building is
constrained by the same design and construction factors.
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Phasing Implications:
According to ARCORP, phase one of the Palace
development will consist of both inner crescents, the
central arch, the retail structure extending through the
arch, and 1,448 parking spaces located behind the inner
crescents. ARCORP believes it must develop what amounts to
784 units in the first phase for several reasons. First, it
feels that it is necessary to establish a critical mass on
the site, to create a vital environment to which people will
be attracted to live and to generate sufficient demand to
support the retail and ferry operations. The remaining
reasons are interrelated. Because of the site's isolation,
a retail service infrastructure must be available
immediately to support the development, thus the retail
structure and central arch must be constructed in phase one.
Given the symmetrical design of the complex, construction of
only one inner crescent and the central arch would appear
awkward and incomplete. Further, for technological reasons,
both inner crescents should be in place before the central
arch and retail structure between them are erected.
For practical as well as marketing considerations, a
north-south road should be developed through the site in
phase one, from the River Road entrance to the Palace to the
junction with the Lincoln Tunnel approach road. If the on-
site road was to halt at the southern crescent, there would
likely be traffic bottlenecks at the single accessway onto
River Road. However, the extension of this road through the
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site will require a threshold commitment to a site plan for
the rest of the 367-acre property.
The need to lay the road in phase one, coupled with the
site plan of the complex, in effect requires that the
utilities for all 2,000 units be installed beneath the road
in the first phase. At an estimated cost for utilities of
$5,000 per unit, this will require an additional up-front
investment of approximately $6 million for the future-phase
utilities. Another implication of the site's physical
constraints and the site plan relates to the piles that must
be driven to support the crescents. It seems sensible to
drive the piles for all four crescents upfront, to avoid
disturbing either the existing structures or their residents
during construction of the later phases.
Overall, the most important consideration in the
design of any large-scale development should be flexibility.
If the initial product is unsuccessful in the marketplace,
the developer should be able to modify the build-out of the
project so that he may still realize the value of the land
and up-front site improvements. Bofill's master plan affords
little flexibility. Moreover, the plan cannot be fully
appreciated until all four crescents are built, because the
design is symmetrical and so tightly integrated. If
prospective buyers reject the architecture of the two
initial crescents, ARCORP's options as to what it may build
on either side of them are limited. Further, the
development program and the site's physical constraints
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prohibit ARCORP from limiting its up-front investment to an
amount commensurate with the return to be realized in the
first phase.
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CHAPTER IV
FINANCIAL FEASIBILITY ANALYSIS
A pro forma computer model of the Palace project was
constructed to analyze the costs and return for each
development phase over time. The model is based on a set of
assumptions covering three principal variables: costs,
absorption rate, sales price. The main purpose of this
before-tax feasibility analysis is to investigate means of
structuring conventional construction loan financing for the
project. On the basis of three basic criteria, the
project's feasibility is evaluated from the perspective of a
construction lender: First, is the loan amount commensurate
with its source of repayment? Second, what is the value of
and risk associated with the collateral? Third, does the
developer have a strong incentive to see the project through
to a successful completion? The impact of possible loan
terms on the developer's return from the project is then
assessed.
This is an introductory pro forma analysis based upon
preliminary estimates of the development costs and a phasing
schedule provided by ARCORP's staff. Nevertheless, the
model displays the influence of several key attributes of
the Palace development on the financial dynamics of the
project.
Site-Driven Decisions:
First, because this is a large-scale development on a
difficult site, the requisite infrastructure investment is
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great. Not only are roads and utilities required,
substantial parking and retail facilities are needed as well
to service the residents, given the site's isolation and the
high density of the proposed development. Further, the
physical constraints make it necessary to front-load most of
the infrastructure costs. For instance, to alleviate the
isolation and enhance the condominiums' marketability, the
retail infrastructure has to be provided at the outset. In
view of the site's restricted access, more residents are apt
to want to own cars there. Thus, the development program
calls for an abundance of parking spaces in the early
phases. In addition, site improvements are front-loaded for
reasons that were discussed in the previous chapter.
Owing to the site's configuration and soil conditions,
there is a cost premium to develop parking at the site.
However, the projected income-producing capacity of the
parking structure does not match its development cost.
Moreover, the income-producing potential of the retail space
is weak since its market is effectively limited to the
Palace residents. Consequently, permanent mortgage loans for
the parking and retail cannot be expected to repay a notable
portion of the overall construction loan for the project.
The major financial implication of these circumstances is
that the development costs are disproportionately high
relative to the returns in the early phases. Substantial
costs must be incurred up-front, yet the corresponding
revenues will come from condominium sales in later phases.
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The condominium sales are the project's primary source
of return and repayment for a construction loan. However,
the sales proceeds in phase one are not commensurate with
the up-front development costs. Thus, ARCORP will most
likely not be able to obtain construction loan financing to
cover 100% of the Palace development costs in phase one,
simply by mortgaging the forty acres which comprise the
Palace parcel. In any phased development, a lender must
protect itself, that is ensure its repayment, should the
project halt after the first phase. A lender's collateral
(the mortgage) is principally security in the event the
project does not succeed as projected, not a primary source
of repayment. Therefore, in this case, the lender's source
of repayment (the projected condominium sales) takes
precedence to its loan's collateral (the 40-acre parcel) as
a matter of credit criteria. Accordingly, ARCORP will
probably have to infuse a sizable amount of equity into the
project up-front, so that the amount of debt on the project
in phase one remains in line with the lender's source of
repayment.
Design Implications:
The second key attribute of the Palace which has
important financial implications is its design, both in
terms of the concept and scale. A large number of units
will be brought on the market at once in phase one, because
ARCORP felt that the design would appear awkward if both
inner crescents and the central arch were not developed
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together. There are also technological benefits involved in
completing both crescents before building the central arch
and retail structure between them. This poses the financial
risk, however, of having to carry a lot of unsold units,
which can erode the project's profit margin. The resulting
pressure to sell units, in order to reduce the carrying
costs, will probably restrain the prices achieved initially
at the Palace. Besides, the large stock of units in the
first phase together with the site's pioneer location will
likely make it difficult to achieve a high percentage of
presales. Also, because of the immediate juxtaposition of
the crescent structures, buyers in phase one (and to a
lesser degree in phases two and three) will probably be
inconvenienced by the ongoing construction of the project.
As a result, buyers in earlier phases will expect attractive
(i.e. lower) prices to compensate for the inconvenience,
which will further restrain the initial prices at the
Palace.
These site and design attributes have led ARCORP to
make an interrelated marketing decision -- to develop enough
units in phase one to establish a critical mass. ARCORP
feels that a critical mass of 700 to 800 units is necessary
to strengthen the marketing campaign and to mitigate the
pioneer image of the development.
Market Absorption Issues:
This critical mass factor is another reason that ARCORP
intends to bring both inner crescents on the market in the
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first phase, but it raises an important issue: the rate of
market absorption. ARCORP has not commissioned a formal,
comprehensive market analysis to substantiate its projected
absorption rate and prices. Admittedly, it is no easy task
to quantify the New York metropolitan area residential
market. However, ARCORP appears to be grounding its plans
on sweeping generalizations about the depth of the Manhattan
condominium market. For instance, it considers the fact
that last year, 8,000 condominium units were absorbed
overall in Manhattan an indicator that its project can
capture 5% of that market, or 400 units per year.
Absorption rate projections are relative concepts.
Their probability is a function of the total number of units
within the project (i.e. percentage of project's supply) and
the total stock of units within the project's market area,
as well as the development period over which they are
expected to be sustained. Within a specific geographic
area, absorption rates are a function of the range of
product types offered, in terms of price, quality and image.
ARCORP's marketing consultant projects that the Palace will
sustain an absorption rate of 500 units per year, over a
four-to-five-year development period. This projection is
considered ambitious for two basic reasons.
First, this absorption assumption implies that if sales
begin as anticipated in June 1987, the entire 784 units in
phase one will be sold out by the time phase-one
construction is complete as expected in the fourth quarter
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of 1988. As noted above, it is questionable that the Palace
could be substantially presold, given its large scale and
frontier setting. Granted there have been condominium
projects in Manhattan that were 100% presold during the hot
market of the early 1980's. At most Manhattan project
locations, however, prospective buyers can explore the
surrounding neighborhood and obtain a fairly vivid
impression of what living there would be like. The Palace
site has an image problem to overcome. It will be more
difficult for prospective buyers to envision the completed
project in phase one and more likely that they will want to
experience walking through and around it, before committing
to purchase a unit.
The second reason this absorption projection seems
delusive, is that the consultant has likened the Palace
development to Battery Park City to support the projection.
Because the Battery Park market may have achieved recent
annual absorption rates of 500 units per year is not a
sufficient indication that the Palace can do the same.
Battery Park City and the Palace are not comparable with
respect to absorption. Battery Park City consists of a
larger stock of units and a broader variety of project
types, in terms of unit size, price, image, and tenure. For
instance, in the second phase of Battery Park's residential
development program, developers are building ten respective
projects that together contain approximately 2,200 units.
The establishment of a mixed residential community is one of
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the goals of the Battery Park City Authority. The Palace,
in contrast, will consist of 2,000 units that are all
essentially the same in terms of image, price and quality.
It should also be noted that Battery Park City's location in
lower Manhattan is not as isolated as that of the Palace
site.
The large scale and pioneer setting of the Palace also
have strong implications (in the short term at least) for
the prices that can be achieved there. ARCORP's marketing
consultant is confident that the Palace units can begin
selling at a price of $225 per square foot, which would
escalate 4% per annum over the development period. In the
condominium market composed of the New-Jersey-waterfront
municipalities, however, there has been an apparent
resistance to hitting the benchmark price of $200 per square
foot.1 The strongest market in the New Jersey waterfront
region is Hoboken. Even there, only a relatively small
number of projects have recently achieved prices averaging
$200 per square foot. These individual projects happen to
be much smaller than the planned 2,000-unit Palace project.
Two projects which achieved these prices, the Jefferson
Trust and Skyline, (both of which were new construction)
contained only 102 and 93 units, respectively.2
Intuitively, it is easier to sell out a smaller project at a
given price level. Thus, the fact that the market absorbed
100 units at $200 per square foot does not adequately
suggest that eight times that number, concentrated within
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one project, can be absorbed at the same price under
comparable market conditions. (Note that ARCORP proposes to
build 784 units in the first phase of the Palace.)
The Hoboken market poses direct competition to the
Palace at Port Imperial. Although the Palace will provide an
exclusive ferry service to Manhattan for its residents,
which no doubt will create a special ambience, Hoboken has
as good access to midtown and downtown Manhattan via the
PATH. Moreover, the droves of Manhattan commuters who are
relocating to Hoboken are attracted by the small city's
close-knit community environment, renovated brownstone
blocks, and growing assortment of trendy shops and
restaurants. The appealing charm of an old, established
community is something which the Palace is not likely to be
able to duplicate immediately.
Another attribute of the Palace development that
strongly influences its financial dynamics is the market in
which it will compete. Both the supply of residential units
along the New Jersey waterfront and trends in the Manhattan
condominium market will impact the prices attained at the
Palace. Not only is ARCORP proposing to bring a large
supply of units on-line, other owners of New Jersey
waterfront sites are planning to develop an unprecedented
amount as well. Moreover, New York residential developers
are currently overbuilding in the Manhattan condominium
market. Under these competitive market conditions, optimism
regarding the prices which can be achieved at the Palace
65
should be kept in check.
Signs of an oncoming glut in the Manhattan market are
already apparent. More than 25,000 new condominium
apartments are flooding onto the Manhattan market over the
next eighteen months, speculative overdevelopment that has
been enough to push "condo" prices down by around 10 per
cent last year, and take another 10 to 15 per cent off the
condo-market average this year.3 "Standard" Manhattan
condominium projects are currently achieving average prices
of about $325 per square foot, as reported in an April study
prepared by a team of Harvard Business School students for
ARCORP. It is the "standard" market against which the Palace
will most likely compete in its attempt to attract
Manhattanites to New Jersey. Prices within this market
would fall below $300 per square foot, if indeed prices fall
10 to 15 per cent as a result of the oversupply. Such a
price decline in the Manhattan market does not augur well
for a price increase in the New Jersey market.
Despite tell-tale signs that the Manhattan residential
market is softening, many owners of New Jersey waterfront
sites are proceeding with their up-market condominium
development plans. Three major projects which are already
underway should compete effectively with the Palace, on the
basis of views, luxury and/or access to Manhattan. Roc
Harbor, to the north of the Palace site, is under
construction and will contain approximately 550 condominiums
in three 16-story towers, along with 17 four-story townhouse
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buildings. Newport City, to the south in Jersey City is a
large-scale mixed-use (office, hotel, retail, and
residential) development being undertaken jointly by three
major developers. Samuel Lefrak is developing the
residential portion which will consist of 9,000 rental
apartments, 1,500 of which are to be developed in the first
phase which began in June 1986.
Perhaps the Palace's strongest competition will come
from Port Liberte at Caven Point in Jersey City which is
being developed by the Spoerry Group, a European consortium
of resort specialists. The project will consist of 1,700
condominiums and townhouses built in village settings along
winding canals, which will enable buyers to dock small boats
in their backyards. The site offers a remarkable view of
the Statue of Liberty and lower Manhattan. Up-river the
site abuts on to Liberty State Park, New Jersey's biggest
(800 acres) urban park. A special bus service is to run
from the site to the Exchange Place PATH station, now being
refurbished, and a ferry service reportedly is to operate
between the site and Battery Park in lower Manhattan.4
The major difference between the Palace and Port
Liberte lies in the architectural approach of each. Although
the canal network at Port Liberte will evoke images of
European cities such as Venice and Amsterdam, the
architectural flavor of the village is to be definitely
American. According to Swiss resort specialist Pierre
Barrier, who is participating in the design effort, "Port
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Liberte will look as though it had grown up here over the
past 200 years".5 Bofill's Palace design, on the other
hand, has a distinctly foreign flavor. The design may not
have broad appeal owing to its uniqueness, which seems to be
a gamble that ARCORP is willing to take. Generally corporate
tenants, seeking symbols of identity and power, are more
receptive to novel architecture. Residential architecture,
in contrast, generally involves decision-making on a more
personal level. Buyers are less inclined to invest in and
inhabit a residence whose style is incongruous with the
broader local environment.6 Overall, ARCORP will have to
launch an intensive marketing campaign to carve a niche for
the Palace in the competitive, albeit diverse, waterfront
market.
Ferry Connection:
The fourth major attribute of the Palace that drives
its financial feasibility (i.e. in addition to site, design
and market attributes) is the proposed ferry service.
Without the access to Manhattan which the ferry facilitates,
the value of ARCORP's property and the proposed condominiums
would be significantly diminished. The ferry operation was
not, however, incorporated in the pro forma analysis of the
Palace. It is seperable, as a business, in a way that the
other operating components of the Palace (parking and
retail) are not. The basic financial implication of this
"attribute" is that it is essentially a mandatory
investment, a service that has to be provided. The ferry
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operation is the key to the value that ARCORP has created
for this property.
Model Assumptions
The assumptions underlying the model are presented in
Exhibits lA and B, while some are also outlined in more
detail in Exhibit 1C. The development budget and schedule
are presented in Exhibit 7. Key assumptions regarding the
development costs, schedule, absorption rate, and sales
prices are discussed below.
Development Costs:
Hard costs to construct the residential buildings are
projected to be $95 per gross square foot. Parking hard
costs are estimated at $12,000 per space. Hard costs to
construct the one-story retail structure (which accounts for
less than 2% of the gross buildable area of the project) are
projected at $70 per gross square foot, without a tenant
allowance. All hard costs are escalated at 4% per annum
over the development period. The budgeted front-end site
improvement costs total approximately $16.3 million, less
than 5% of the overall project hard costs. The other major
front-end expense is that of the sales offices, which are
estimated to cost $4.5 million and $2 million, respectively,
at the site and at the New York ferry pier. The sales
office at the site will contain model units. As the plan
for the proposed marina is sketchy at present, this
component of the project was not incorporated in the model.
Total project soft costs (including the developer's fee
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which is deferred and paid out of gross sales) total
approximately $103.5 million, 26% of total hard costs
excluding land. (Note that the sales offices are presented
as a hard cost in Exhibits 6 and 7. This is actually a
marketing cost and as such, could be regarded as a soft-cost
item. In that case, soft costs would total $110 million,
28% of total hard costs excluding land.) This estimate of
soft costs may be low. As a general rule of thumb, soft
costs in a condominium project usually equal 35 to 40 per
cent of total hard costs and land acquisition.
The most significant soft cost item, after financing
and marketing costs, is the common area fees and real estate
taxes on unsold condominium units. Although ARCORP has not
yet thoroughly addressed this item, it has important
implications both for the development budget and the
marketability of the units, vis-a-vis competitors' projects.
ARCORP proposes to privatize most municipal services for its
development, such as road construction and maintenance and
on-site security and emergency services. This factor,
combined with the high level of maintenance which the lavish
landscaping will require, is likely to result in substantial
common area fees. ARCORP is seeking to obtain an abatement
of the prohibitively high West New York tax rate for its
development, on the grounds that the development will not be
dependent upon the Town for the provision of most municipal
services. Nevertheless, it is unknown whether or not an
abatement would represent a dollar-for-dollar tradeoff
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between lower taxes and higher common area fees. It may be
more reasonable to assume that common area fees and real
estate taxes at the Palace will be high relative to
comparable condominium developments in the area.
A preliminary estimate by ARCORP's marketing consultant
of $4.00 per square foot for the annual common area fee at
the Palace is based on the rate charged (inclusive of
individual-unit electricity charges) at the neighboring
high-rise complex, the Galaxy Towers. However, the level
and scope of services provided at the Galaxy are not
comparable to those envisioned for the Palace. The Galaxy
has virtually no landscaped grounds or private roads. Nor is
the Galaxy property as extensive as that which the Palace
security service will have to patrol. Despite the inclusion
of unit electricity charges, which raise the Galaxy fees,
the Palace common area fees are bound to be higher.
It is difficult to select a condominium development to
serve as a direct comparison for the Palace, given its
rather unique setting and circumstances. However, the
Liberty House project at Battery Park City in lower
Manhattan does provide valuable insight into the cost of
maintaining such a development. Liberty House is within the
jurisdiction of the Battery Park City Authority, which
provides municipal facilities such as sewers and water lines
and which owns and maintains the roads, esplanade and parks
within Battery Park City. Consequently, Liberty House
residents must contribute toward the cost of maintaining the
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civic facilities as part of their condominium maintenance
fees. According to the Liberty House Condominium Offering
Plan, the annual maintenance fee is approximately $5.50 per
square foot.7
Based on these two cases, the common area fee
assumption used in the model is $4.50 per square foot.
Further, under the assumption that ARCORP will obtain a 50%
tax abatement, the annual tax per square foot would be an
additional $5.45. (This is based on an initial average sales
price projection of $241,000 per unit in 1987.) Thus,
common area fees and real estate taxes are projected to
begin at $12,000 per unit ($1,000 per month) and escalate 2%
per annum. These assumptions are more in line with
ARCORP's. They are optimistic assumptions, however.
Maintenance costs at the Palace may be closer to those at
Liberty House. At $5.50 per square foot, annual common area
fees would be about $1,200 per unit higher. Likewise,
ARCORP may not obtain a tax abatement.
Development Schedule:
The model is based on a quarterly development schedule.
This is considered more appropriate than an annual schedule
for a condominium development of this type, because it
facilitates a more accurate projection of the interest
expense and carrying cost of unsold units. Both of these
soft-cost items can be critical to maintaining an adequate
profit margin in a condominium development.
In the model, it is assumed that pre-development soft
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legal and marketing expenses,
associated with phase one, will be incurred beginning in the
1986 third quarter. Development of two sales offices in New
Jersey and New York, respectively, is scheduled to commence
then as well. These offices are to open and sales are to
begin by June 1987. Site improvement work is assumed to
begin the next quarter (1986/4), while the groundbreaking
for the first crescent is scheduled to occur in April 1987
(1987/2). (See Exhibit 6.) Granted this timetable seems
ambitious when the approval process ARCORP has yet to
undergo is considered.
Absorption Rate:
A constant absorption rate of 250 units per year is
assumed in the model. This results in the first phase being
51% sold-out by the completion of both inner crescents and
the central arch. In the model, the absorption assumption
drives the construction schedule. In view of the negative
financial impact of carrying unsold units, construction of
phases two through four is scheduled to be complete by the
time each phase is between 38 and 45 per cent presold. (See
Table 2.) Again, this assumes a constant annual absorption
rate of 250 units per year, over what amounts to an eight-
year development period. It should be noted that
construction of the crescents and towers is projected to
take twelve months, despite the alleged time savings of the
proposed Forest City Dillon construction process. This is
owing to design features which are not usually present in
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costs such as design,
Port Imperial
West New York, New Jersey
Table 2
CONSTRUCTION PHASING
Construction Dates
Start Finish
% Sold Upon
Completion of:
Ind. Bldg. Phase
ONE:
N Mid-C
S Mid-C
Ctr Arch
TWO:
THREE:
FOUR:
784
364
364
56
474
474
270
Apr.
Sept.
Feb.
Apr.
Apr.
'87
'87
'88
'90
'92
Mar.
Aug.
Oct.
'88
'88
'88
Mar. '91
Mar. '93
Oct. '93 Sept. '94
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Phase # Units
58%
46%
51%
27%
43%
51%
38%
45%
43%
the typical high-rise apartment building.
Price:
Despite the high standards of construction and
amenities, the ferry service, waterfront location, and view,
prices at the Palace are likely to be constrained by the
following conditions: the site's isolation; the project's
large scale and consequent pressure to achieve high
absorption rates; the soft Manhattan condominium market;
competition from other New Jersey waterfront projects.
Moreover, the potentially high common area fees and real
estate taxes at the Palace may restrain prices, effectively
maintaining a competitive tradeoff between salesprices and
living expenses vis-a-vis other projects. In view of these
conditions, it is improbable that the Palace will set new
records for the New Jersey market, at prices well above the
$200 per square foot mark, from the outset of its sales
campaign. The assumption in the model is that units will
begin selling in 1987 at an average price of $200 per square
foot, which price will escalate 6% per annum. While the
starting price is conservative, the belief is that the
relatively generous escalation factor will account for the
units' appreciation, as the site establishes an identity and
the design is built-out.
Evaluating Feasibility: Construction Lender's Perspective
The Palace is essentially a condominium project (not a
mixed-use project) in which the retail and parking
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components are essential amenities. Accordingly, in the
model the project is analyzed as a whole rather than as
separate operating parts; therefore, soft costs are
allocated over the entire project instead of to individual
uses such as condominium, parking and retail. It should
also be noted that in a large-scale development such as the
Palace, a lender would issue loan commitments in phases
corresponding to the project's build-out, rather than commit
up-front to lend an amount for the entire project.
The major financing implication of the Palace's design
and program is that the project's uses are not easily
divisible into separate parts, which can be financed with
individual mortgage loans. Therefore, a construction
lender's principal source of repayment will be the
condominium sales. Arranging permanent loans to repay
portions of the construction loan, by mortgaging either the
parking structure or the retail space, may be infeasible (in
the short term at least) for several reasons that are
discussed below.
In this section, a lender's source of repayment and
collateral are assessed with respect to the Palace
development. Also, the individual and cumulative gross
margins (i.e. net sales proceeds less total costs) in each
development phase are analyzed on an accounting and a cash-
flow basis. On the former basis, the up-front sitework and
sales-office costs are allocated to each phase according to
its pro rata share of total units. On a cash-flow basis,
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ARCORP's total investment in the project is taken into
account on a quarterly basis, to identify the number of
units that ARCORP would have to sell in order to breakeven.
Source of Repayment:
In project finance, the loan amount is typically based
on the economics of the individual project. Thus, a lender
generally will not lend an amount in excess of that which it
can reasonably expect to be repaid from the project. This is
the case whether the collateral's value is sufficient (on a
loan-to-value basis) to support a larger loan or not. With
respect to phase one of the Palace, a lender would probably
not make a loan in excess of the amount which could
reasonably be repaid from the sale of the condominiums built
in that phase. For if the project was to halt after phase
one, the only source of repayment for the outstanding loan
would be the foreclosure on and sale of the mortgaged
property. (However, if Arthur Imperatore was personally to
guarantee repayment of the excess loan amount, a lender
would likely increase its construction loan.)
As stated above, it will be difficult, particularly in
the first phase, for ARCORP to obtain permanent mortgage
financing for the parking structure and the retail space to
serve as additional sources of repayment for the
construction loan. Income from the parking structure is
almost entirely dependent on condominium sales. Upon the
sale of all 784 units in phase one, the daily average
parking occupancy rate is projected to be 62%. Under the
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model's assumptions regarding monthly and daily parking
rents, the annual net operating income from parking at that
point would be $467,300. Under assumed permanent loan terms
of 10% interest only (no amortization) and 1.2 debt service
coverage, the maximum debt that this level of income can
support is approximately $3.9 million. This is an
insignificant amount when one considers that the projected
cost to build the 1,448 parking spaces in phase one is $17.8
million, exclusive of land and soft costs. (Note that the
projected net operating income from parking upon the sale of
all 2,002 units could support a maximum loan of $17.5
million. Yet the complete parking structure containing 2,902
spaces is estimated to cost $38 million, exclusive of land
and soft costs.)
Even if ARCORP was to obtain a permanent loan
commitment of $3.9 million for the parking in the first
phase, the commitment would not be viewed as completely
reliable by a construction lender. The amount represents a
maximum that is contingent upon the sale of 100% of the
units in phase one. Further, it is questionable whether or
not the mortgaging of the parking structure in phases is
legally practicable, because of the physical integration of
the sections within the structure. Also, the development
program calls for initial excess parking capacity to be
utilized in subsequent phases. Since the marketablity of
later-phase units, and to a lesser degree the retail space,
is dependent upon the provision of adequate parking, a
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lender may be reluctant to release all of the parking from
its lien on the property in the earlier phases. A lender
may wish to retain control of a substantial parking reserve,
in the event it must foreclose during the construction of a
subsequent phase. (For instance, the condominiums built in
phase four will depend on parking developed in previous
phases.)
In all likelihood, ARCORP will encounter difficulty in
arranging financing for the retail space at the Palace as
well, for two basic reasons. First, it will not be easy to
attract retail tenants to this site, as the market for these
establishments will effectively be limited to the Palace
residents. This retail space is unlikely to become a
destination shopping area; for one thing, it is too small. A
retail center without a major anchor typically contains at
least 65,000 rentable square feet.8 In the first phase, 784
households are unlikely to generate an adequate demand to
sustain approximately 40,000 rentable square feet of retail
space. Yet, it is essential to marketing the condominiums
in phase one that the development contain a convenience
retail "infrastructure" from the onset. Thus, it is
probable that to induce retailers to " set-up shop", ARCORP
will have to enter into short-term (i.e. five-year) leases,
under terms that provide substantial concessions, perhaps
free rent for the initial two to three years. (Note that
ARCORP intends to own and manage the retail space, 2,000
gross square feet of which it will operate as a ferry
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terminal.) Such leases will not be able to support a
mortgage loan on their merits alone, as they will not
generate sufficient income to cover debt service in the
initial years.
Secondly, because the retail is interwoven with the
residential areas and also scattered throughout several
buildings, the mortgaging of it undoubtedly will raise some
complex legal issues. As designed, ARCORP will own the
retail areas under the condominium form of ownership, in the
same manner as that of the respective owners of the
residential units. A lender may be reluctant to accept a
mortgage on condominium retail space since, in the event of
foreclosure, its handling of the property might be
restricted by the authority of the condominium owners'
association. More importantly though, given the relatively
small amount of retail space at the Palace, it may not be
worth a lender's time to deal with the legal complexities.
Collateral:
Based solely on the value of the collateral, which is
assumed to be the forty acres that comprise the Palace
development parcel, the maximum construction loan amount for
phase one would be about $184 million. This amount was
determined in two parts corresponding to the respective
values of the condominiums to be developed and the remaining
land as follows: The gross sell out of the 784 condominiums
in phase one is projected to be about $206.2 million,
against which a lender would loan a maximum of 75% or $155
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million. The respective values of the retail space and the
parking are a function of the income to be generated by
these components. As the retail space is not expected to
produce any income initially, it is not regarded as valid
collateral. Arguably, the parking should be considered
additional collateral. At the time phase one is sold out,
the capitalized value of the net operating income from
parking is $5.2 million, based on a 9% capitalization rate.
At a 75% loan-to-value ratio, ARCORP could possibly borrow
another $3.9 million against this.
The value of the remaining land in the parcel, which
constitutes the rest of the collateral, is uncertain. Land
value is a function of the value of that which can be
developed on it. As a general rule of thumb in high-rise
condominium developments, a developer will pay on a per-unit
basis up to 15% of the expected gross unit sales price for
"prepared" land (i.e. cleared, graded, with roads and
infrastructure).
ARCORP feels that the Palace parcel is worth $40,000
per dwelling unit in its present raw state. This is high
given that the land is not currently developable. It would
be a reasonable estimate if the land was prepared. The
projected average gross sales price in phase one is $218 per
square foot or about $262,700 per unit. Fifteen per cent of
this unit price is approximately $40,000. It is assumed in
the model, for reasons discussed below, that ARCORP will use
equity to finance most of the sitework before the first-
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phase construction loan closes in the 1987 second quarter.
Thus, the land securing the construction loan will
be prepared essentially and as such, is valued at $40,000
per unit. The remaining land is valued at $48.7 million
since the parcel, as zoned, may accommodate another 1,218
units. Because loans secured by undeveloped land are
considered riskier than construction loans that finance the
development of income-producing or for-sale improvements, a
lender generally will not loan more than 60% of the land's
appraised value. Consequently, a lender would loan
approximately $29 million against the remaining land in the
Palace parcel.
In this particular situation, the risk involved in
lending against the value of the Palace parcel's remaining
land is considerable. In effect, the bank would be lending
against ARCORP's development rights in the parcel (15 acres
of which are underwater), not land per se. The "land" value
assigned to the 270 units to be developed in phase four, for
instance, actually relates to air rights, as these units are
intended to be built above the parking structure. Further,
the remaining land, or development rights, is only worth
$40,000 per dwelling unit if phase one is successful, that
is if the units sell out at the projected price level.
The design master plan of the Palace imposes additional
risk on the lender. If the market rejects the architecture
of the two crescents built in phase one, the value of the
land on either side and the air rights along the back will
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diminish significantly. In the worst case, if the bank had
to foreclose during the first phase, it would be hard-
pressed to realize any value from the remaining development
rights. The options would be limited as to what could be
developed on either side of the crescents that would be both
compatible with Bofill's design, yet different enough
architecturally so as to appeal more to the market. Given
this risk, it is likely that a lender would either reduce
its loan against the land or require additional security,
such as personal guarantees of payment of any amount loaned
in excess of a specified ceiling.
Equity Requirement:
Total development costs in phase one, including all of
the up-front costs of the sitework and sales offices, are
projected to be about $214.6 million. Obviously, this
amount cannot be financed entirely with debt since it
exceeds the maximum loan amount of $184 million, determined
above strictly on the basis of the collateral's value. In
all likelihood, a lender would expect ARCORP to infuse
equity into the project up-front to cover a majority of this
gap for the following reason. A lender wants to be
confident that its borrower, the developer, has a strong
incentive from the beginning to see the project through to a
successful completion.
If ARCORP's equity in the Palace was limited to the
land and its expenditures to date, its stake would be
relatively insignificant in two respects. (Note that in
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1981, ARCORP paid only $840,000 for the Palace parcel,
roughly $21,000 per acre. In current (1986) dollars,
ARCORP's land cost and other expenditures to date amount to
about $4.3 million, as detailed in Table 4.) First, from a
lender's perspective, this represents an immaterial
percentage of the entire development's projected cost of
$490 million. (See Exhibit 7.) Secondly, this parcel is a
relatively small portion of ARCORP's total investment
portfolio. If this project failed and the bank had to
foreclose on the 40-acre parcel, the blow to ARCORP's
reputation might be hard. However, ARCORP's financial loss
would be relatively small if it never increased its present
equity stake in the project. This is a very risky
development from a lender's perspective. The developer is
inexperienced; the proposed design and construction methods
are unconventional; the location is virtually a frontier;
and the costs are disproportionately high relative to the
returns in the early phases. ARCORP will definitely have to
increase its equity stake in the project and assume a larger
share of the risk upfront.
In the model, it is assumed that ARCORP will apply
equity to cover the costs in the first three quarters of the
development period (1986/3 through 1987/1). These costs are
mainly for sitework, the sales offices, and pre-development
soft costs, associated specifically with phase one, such as
design, engineering, legal fees, insurance, and marketing.
These costs amount to about $28.1 million. It is further
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assumed that the first-phase construction loan will close in
the 1987 second quarter, at the time construction of the
first crescent is scheduled to commence. (It should be
noted that in actuality, a lender would probably condition
its loan advances on the achievement of a specified
percentage of presales.)
Again the primary credit issue of the lender's source
of repayment comes to bear. The principal source of
repayment in all four phases of the Palace is the net sales
proceeds from the condominiums. For the reasons discussed
above, the availability of permanent mortgage financing for
the parking is dubious in the early phases. Moreover, it is
unlikely that permanent financing will ever be obtained for
the retail space. In phase one, the net sales proceeds are
projected to be about $193 million. If in the first phase a
lender did loan $184 million, the maximum based strictly on
the collateral, it would not be repaid until ARCORP had sold
95% of the 784 units, at the projected average price of $218
per square foot. This assumes that ARCORP would apply 100%
of the net sales proceeds from each sale to pay down the
loan. A lender usually does not want to have to wait to be
repaid until practically all of the units have been sold in
a condominium development. Generally, a lender expects to
be repaid by the time 80 to 85 per cent of the units have
been sold at the projected prices.
To account for this constraint, the maximum loan amount
for the first phase in the model was reduced from $184
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million (the maximum based strictly on the collateral's
value) to $166 million. This implies that ARCORP will have
to sell 86% of the units built in phase one to repay the
loan, provided that it applies 100% of the net sales
proceeds to reduce the loan balance. (Note that if ARCORP
is able to obtain a $3.9 million permanent loan for the
parking to repay a portion of the construction loan in phase
one, it will still have to sell more than 80% of the units
to repay the loan.)
With the reduced loan amount of $166 million, ARCORP
would have to infuse another $20.5 million of equity to
cover the balance of the projected costs in phase one. In
view of the fact that ARCORP will have contributed the land
and about $28.1 million in equity up-front, it is assumed in
the model that the first-phase loan will finance 100% of
project costs beginning in the 1987 second quarter, until
the $166 million commitment has been fully advanced in the
1988 fourth quarter. (See Exhibit 8.) This assumption is
based on one condition, that ARCORP issue guarantees of
completion and payment of interest and maintenance (i.e.
common area fees and real estate taxes on the unsold units).
Once the loan has been fully advanced, ARCORP would be
responsible for paying the remaining costs of phase one. By
that point though, the remaining costs are projected to be
mainly interest, maintenance and marketing totaling $20.5
million, most of which ARCORP would be obligated to pay
under the above payment guarantee. (It is not atypical for
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a lender to require such guarantees in any condominium
development; in fact, a lender would probably require them
throughout the four phases of the Palace. It is also likely
to be more appropriate for A-P-A or Arthur Imperatore to
issue these guarantees.)
The loan commitments in phases two through four were
determined with respect to the projected net sales proceeds
in each phase (i.e. the source of repayment), in the same
manner as that in phase one. In these three phases, the
respective construction loan commitments cover 100% of the
projected development costs. The gradual relaxation of the
repayment terms (i.e. percentage of net unit sales proceeds
that must be applied to repay loan) reflects the increasing
profitability of the development over time. In this way, the
lender allows the developer to begin recouping the equity
that he invested up-front, instead of making him wait until
the very end of the project.
Summary financial data for the four development phases
are presented in Table 3. The salient points, with regard
to the respective loan commitment amounts, repayment terms,
and lender's breakeven (i.e. the number and percentage of
unit sales required to repay loan) are presented below:
Phase: One Two Three Four
Loan Commitment: $166MM $110MM $112MM $52MM
Repayment Terms: 100% 98% 95% 80%
(% of net sales)
Lender's Breakeven: 86% 83% 78% 67%
(% and # of units) 674 393 370 181
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Table 3 SUMMARY FINANCIAL DATA
PHASE: ONE TWO THREE FOUR
Total Costs:
Cash Flow Basis $214.6MM $109.1MM $111.2MM $ 50.4MM
Pro-rata Accounting $200.7MM $114.5MM $116.6MM $ 53.5MM
Gross Sales $206.2MM $144.OMM $160.7MM $103.4MM
Average Price PSF $218 $252 $281 $318
Net Sales Proceeds $193.OMM $135.OMM $151.0MM $ 97.0MM
(including NOI from $194.0MM $135.4MM $151.6MM $ 97.7MM
parking and retail)
Loan Commitment $166.OMM $110.0MM $112.OMM $ 52.0MM
Maximum Parking Loan $ 3.9MM $ 3.5MM $ 5.1MM $ 5.0MM
(if available)
Repayment Terms 100% 98% 95% 80%
Lender's Breakeven 86% 83% 78% 67%
(with parking loan) 84% 81% 75% 61%
Gross Margin:
Individual (3%) 18% 30% 83%
Cumulative (3%) 5% 11% 19%
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Under the arrangement described above, ARCORP is
projected to invest approximately $48.6 million of equity in
total into the project, in addition to the land, during
phase one. This amount represents 23% of the total
development costs in phase one of $214.6 million, which in a
typical development would probably be considered a high
proportion of equity. However, $48.6 million is not an
unreasonable amount of equity relative to the projected cost
of the overall development of $485.3 million, in which case
it amounts to 10% of the total development costs. (Note
that total development costs including sewer fees, sales
commissions and developer's fees, items which are assumed to
be paid out of the condominium gross sales proceeds, amount
to about $523.9 million. Relative to this figure, ARCORP's
equity investment represents 9% of total costs.)
It is further assumed in the model that once the loan
amount for a particular phase is repaid, the proceeds from
the remaining unit sales in that phase will flow directly to
the developer. (i.e. These proceeds are not required to
reduce the outstanding balance of the loan for the
subsequent phase.) The individual loan amount in each
subsequent phase will be repaid from the net sales proceeds
of the units built in that phase. In this way also, the
developer is able to realize his return as the project is
developed, rather than having to wait until its ultimate
completion.
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Evaluating Feasibility: Developer's Perspective
In a condominium development, a construction lender
generally expects there to be a gross margin of about 20 per
cent. Granted this is a static measure of return. A
developer's return is really a function of the net cash
flows over time from a project. Still, the gross margin is
a useful parameter for gauging the impact of the program and
phasing on the financial feasibility of the Palace
development. The individual and cumulative gross margins in
each phase are calculated below on an accounting basis. The
sitework and sales-office costs which are incurred in the
initial phase, but support the entire development, are
allocated to the four phases on a pro-rata-unit basis. In
one respect, the gross margin is an awkward measure of
return to apply to the Palace. In this project, the
condominium sales essentially must subsidize the costs to
develop the parking and retail. Because it is unlikely that
permanent financing can be obtained for either the parking
or retail, the gross margin in this context is actually a
comparison of the aggregate cost of all components to the
net sales proceeds plus net operating income from parking
and retail in a specific period.
Overall, the gross margin of the Palace is 19%. This
is based on projected total costs of $485.3 million, net
sales proceeds of $576 million, and annual net operating
income from parking and retail of $2.1 million and $0.8
million, respectively. It should be noted, however, that
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because this is a phased development, in which there is
substantial front-loading of the sitework, parking, retail,
and marketing costs, the gross margin at completion is a
misleading indicator of the development's progressive
profitability. The financial model indicates that the
overall gross margin is very sensitive to the return in the
fourth phase, in which the bulk of the profits is expected
to be generated. (It should also be noted that total costs,
as reported here, are exclusive of ARCORP's current-dollar
investment in the land.)
Under the model's assumptions, the gross margin in the
first phase is negative 3%. The total pro-rata costs in
phase one of $200.7 million actually exceed combined
revenues from condominium net sales ($193 million) and net
operating income from parking and retail (approximately $1
million). (Note that the gross margin is negative 4% if
ARCORP's investment in the land is included in the total
pro-rata costs of phase one.) This deficit picture results
from both the program and construction schedule in phase
one. The construction costs are expensive, given the
proposed levels of quality and complexity, relative to the
projected initial prices. Hard costs alone, on a per unit
basis, amount to 78% of the projected average net salesprice
($191,620 versus $245,880). Note that this includes the
hard costs of the parking and retail, not just the
condominiums. Also, a surplus amount of parking is to be
developed in phase one. As zoned, 1.5 spaces per unit are
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required, but ARCORP plans to develop a ratio of 1.9. This
may be a wise tactic from a marketing perspective, to
prevent a parking shortage for either residents or visitors.
However, ARCORP plans to develop all 1,448 spaces as
structured parking, which substantially raises the costs
above that for surface parking.
The construction schedule also has a negative impact on
the return in the first phase. ARCORP proposes to complete
the second crescent containing 364 units just five months
after completion of the first, followed within two months by
completion of the central arch which has 56 units. At the
assumed absorption rate of 250 units per year, this implies
that ARCORP will be carrying over 300 unsold units, on
average, for nearly two years between the 1988 third and
1990 first quarters. The carrying costs for unsold units
and construction interest expense in phase one amount to
$6.6 million and $16.7 million, respectively. Combined, this
is 12% of the total pro rata costs of phase one. If these
costs were reduced by half, the gross margin in the first
phase would increase to positive 2%.
Even if the first phase sells out as projected in the
model, ARCORP will still have about $20.7 million of equity
in the project at the end of phase one. If ARCORP invests
the maximum projected equity amount -- $48.6 million -- in
addition to the land, it will recoup $27.9 million, or 57%,
from sales proceeds in phase one after the repayment of the
first-phase loan. To improve the gross margin and reduce
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its equity exposure in this phase, ARCORP could attempt one
of the following measures:
It could raise its initial condominium sales prices.
However, then it would run the risk of pricing itself out of
the market and/or lowering the absorption rate and incurring
higher maintenance and interest costs. It might sell rather
than rent the parking spaces. At the current market price
of about $10,000 per space, it could raise close to $8
million from parking sales in phase one. The tradeoff under
this option is that ARCORP would have to relinquish control
of most, if not all, of the parking facilities to the
condominium owners' association. Alternatively, ARCORP might
increase the initial parking rent from the projected $100
per month. It may not have much leeway to do this, however,
if the common area fees and real estate taxes at the project
are already relatively high. Buyers may be reluctant to
absorb higher parking fees on top of these expenses.
Moreover, as the residents will be charged additionally for
the ferry service, on a "pay-as-you-go" basis, they may be
even more sensitive to the collective impact of these
various fees.
ARCORP could also investigate means to reduce the costs
in phase one. For instance, it could develop a combination
of structured and surface parking in the first phase and
still provide the planned 1,448 spaces. ARCORP's site is so
large, it could pave a small portion for temporary use as a
visitors' parking area and provide a shuttle bus, if
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necessary, to the crescents. In this way it could defer the
cost of structured parking to later phases. One strong
measure that ARCORP could take would be to defer
construction of the second crescent, until a greater
percentage of units had been presold in phase one. However,
this would necessitate deferring construction of the central
arch and retail structure, which might negatively impact the
marketing of the units in the first crescent.
The individual gross margin in phase two is a much-
improved 18%. Its positive contribution raises the
project's cumulative gross margin to 5%. Thus, on an
accounting basis, the project breaks even sometime during
the second phase. On a cash-flow basis as well, the model
indicates that ARCORP will breakeven in phase two (i.e.
recoup its full equity investment and begin to realize a
positive cumulative cash flow) once approximately 1,244
units, or 62% of the 2,002 units planned, have been sold.
(See Exhibit 8.) In phase three, the individual gross margin
is a healthy 30%, and the cumulative margin is 11%.
Apparently, the impact of the negative margin in phase one
continues to restrain the project's cumulative return.
The individual gross margin in phase four is a whopping
83%. This is obviously a result of the program and
projected price appreciation. Total pro-rata costs are
projected to be $53.5 million as compared with net sales
proceeds of $97 million and additional income from parking
and retail of $0.7 million. No costs are incurred for
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parking or landscaping, as both will have been completed in
the previous three phases. Also, this is the smallest
phase, containing just 270 units. Thus, the maintenance
costs for unsold units and interest expense are
comparatively low, both because the units sell-out over a
shorter period and the aggregate costs are much lower.
The projected average gross price for the condominiums
in this phase is $318 per square foot. At this point, the
model's 6% per annum price escalation factor seems
questionable. It is difficult to imagine prices breaking
the $300 per square foot mark at this site, albeit eight
years hence. It seems even more doubtful when one considers
that the units built in phase four will be in the least
desirable location, along the back and above the parking,
without a view of Manhattan.
Under the model's assumptions, phase four boosts the
cumulative gross margin of the Palace to 19%. However, if
the prices achieved in phase four equal only 90% of the
amount projected, the individual gross margin falls to 65%
and the development's cumulative margin falls to 17%. Thus,
if prices drop 10% in phase four, the gross margin of the
overall project falls 10%. So it appears that the
achievement of the gross margin benchmark of 20% is highly
dependent upon the return generated in the final phase.
Yet, the return in this phase is the most speculative, since
it is unknown whether prices will indeed appreciate that
strongly or whether the absorption of units on the site can
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be sustained at that volume.
It should be noted again that the cost amounts used
above to calculate the gross margin at various intervals are
exclusive of ARCORP's current-dollar land investment.
Apparently, if a developer was to pay $40,000 per dwelling
unit for the Palace parcel today, the proposed development
would be infeasible under the model's assumptions. (With
the additional land cost of about $80 million, the project's
overall gross margin would be 2%.)
The before-tax net present value of ARCORP's investment
in the Palace is a function of several key variables: land
book value (including ARCORP's expenditures to date with
respect to the aggregate 367 acres); the proportion
allocated to the Palace parcel; the amount and timing of
cash equity infusions into the Palace; the amount and timing
of cash flow received from condominium sales, parking and
retail; the before-tax discount rate applied to these cash
flows. The first two of these variables are the subject of
Table 4. There, the historical costs (incurred between 1981
and 1985) of ARCORP's land acquisition and expenditures with
respect to the 367-acre site are inflated to current (1986)
dollars. Of this total, a portion is allocated to the
Palace parcel on a pro-rata acreage basis. As there is
currently no debt on the property, this approach attempts to
reflect the accrued equity (or opportunity) cost of ARCORP's
investment.
Alternatively, no value could be assigned to the land
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ARCORP'S
Historical
Costs
$ 7,750,000
Table 4
EXPENDITURES TO
Current (1986)
Dollars
$15,588,000
DATE
Portion Allocated
to 40-acre Parcel
$1,699,000
SITE IMPROVEMENTS
& CONSULTING FEES:
1981 $ 47,000 $ 94,500 $ 10,400
1982 2,172,000 3,799,000 417,900
1983 4,619,000 7,025,000 772,800
1984 4,465,000 5,905,000 649,600
1985 6,184,000 7,112,000 782,300
TOTAL: $25,237,000 $39,523,500 $4,332,000
Source: J. Dugan, Finance Officer, ARCORP Properties, Inc.
1 The historical costs are inflated at ARCORP's carrying
cost of capital which is assumed to be 15%.
2 Current-dollar total is allocated on a pro-rata acreage
basis.
3 The historical cost (or book value) of ARCORP's
investment in the 40-acre parcel is $2,751,000.
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LAND:
1981
(and expenditures to date), if one takes the view that no
additional cash outlays are required to secure the land at
this point in time. The determination of the project's net
present value involves a discounted cash flow analysis.
Accordingly, some may view ARCORP's historical expenditures
as a sunken cost, not as a cash outflow at the time the net
present value is determined. The net present value is
determined below from both perspectives (i.e. that the
initial cash outflow equals ARCORP's current-dollar
investment in the parcel and that it equals zero).
In effect, the impact of the third variable (the amount
and timing of ARCORP's equity infusions) is a function of
the underwriting of the loan for the project. The net
present value is determined below under two scenarios.
Recall that under the model's assumptions, ARCORP is
expected to infuse approximately $28.1 million of equity
into the project up-front, before the first-phase
construction loan closes. In the first scenario, it is
assumed that ARCORP will invest this equity "out-of-pocket".
It is assumed in the second scenario that two loan
facilities will be arranged to finance the project, a
construction loan secured by the 40-acre Palace parcel and a
land loan secured by other property within the 367-acre
site. The purpose of the land loan would be to allow ARCORP
to raise cash to meet the initial equity requirement in the
Palace development.
The amount and interest rate of the land loan are
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assumed to be $30 million and 10% per annum, respectively.
The entire amount (less a one-half per cent fee) would be
advanced at the loan's closing, which is assumed to occur at
the end of the 1986 third quarter. Interest would be paid by
ARCORP out-of-pocket. The loan would be due in full at the
end of the 1995 second quarter, by which time the Palace is
projected to have sold out. This is what is commonly
referred to as a bullet loan, since the principal is not
amortized during the loan term. It should be noted again
that land loans are considered very risky by lenders, and
consequently, are difficult to obtain. The loan-to-value
ratio is generally limited to 60%, which stems from the
uncertainty of a land loan's source of repayment. A land
loan is typically repaid upon the sale or refinancing of the
property. Therefore, a lender wants to maintain an adequate
cushion between the loan amount and the land's appraised
value, as the latter is inherently speculative on the basis
of future market conditions.
In ARCORP's case, the conditions which affect its
property's value are rather unique. These conditions would
likely spark controversy between ARCORP and a lender in
negotiations regarding the value of the parcel mortgaged to
secure the above land loan. The value of ARCORP's site is
highly dependent upon means of access. Since ARCORP
possesses the ferry permit and controls the right-of-way
through the site, the land's value to ARCORP is greater than
what it would be worth to a lender upon foreclosure.
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In all probability, the ferry permit runs with the
operator (party to whom it was issued), and not with the
land. The permit is also probably not assignable (e.g. to a
lender as additional security). Moreover, it is highly
unlikely that ARCORP would assign either the ferry permit or
the right-of-way to support a mortgage on another portion of
the 367-acre site, simply to raise $30 million.
Nevertheless, legal arrangements would have to be made to
ensure that a lender would have adequate access to any such
mortgaged parcel in the event of foreclosure.
The fourth key variable affecting the net present value
(cash flow from sales and net operating income) is a
function of the assumptions underlying the model. Lastly,
with respect to the fifth variable, ARCORP's before-tax
discount rate is assumed to be 20%. This may seem somewhat
aggressive under current economic conditions of lower
interest rates and inflation. However, it is deemed an
appropriate rate of return given the sizable risks involved
in the Palace development.
If ARCORP invests the requisite equity into the Palace
out-of-pocket, the net present value of its investment is
negative $1.1 million when its current-dollar investment in
the land ($4,332,000) is treated as the initial cash
outflow. If no value is assigned to the land, hence the
initial cash flow equals zero, the resultant net present
value is positive $3.3 million. The before-tax internal
rates of return from both perspectives are 19.4% and 21.8%,
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respectively. (See Exhibit 10.)
Under the second scenario, in which ARCORP uses the
proceeds of the land loan to satisfy the initial Palace
equity requirement, the net present value is considerably
higher. The positive impact on the net present value, of
effectively postponing the initial equity investment until
the land loan is due in 1995, outweighs the impact of the
additional interest expense associated with the land loan.
Under this scenario, if the initial cash outflow is assumed
to equal ARCORP's current-dollar investment in the land, the
net present value equals $10.5 million. If the initial cash
flow is assumed to equal zero, the net present value is
$14.8 million. The internal rate of return is 37.1% under
the first of these assumptions. However, it is negative
under the second assumption and hence, not a meaningful
measure of return. (This result is due to inherent
limitations in the process of calculating the internal rate
of return.) These returns are summarized in Table 5.
This initial pro forma analysis of the Palace
development indicates that ARCORP may not achieve a return
that is commensurate with the level of risk it would be
undertaking. Certainly, if ARCORP must invest a large
amount of equity into the project upfront, its projected
return (net present value) is small relative to its equity
exposure (if not negative, depending upon one's perspective
on the land investment). ARCORP's projected breakeven may
be reasonable in percentage terms at 62% of the total units.
Port Imperial
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Table 5
DISCOUNTED RETURNS UNDER
ALTERNATIVE LAND/FINANCING SCENARIOS
Return Measure
NPV
IRR
Land At Current Cost
Cash With
Equity Land Loan
($1.081MM) $10.472MM
19.4% 37.1%
Land At Zero Cost
Cash With
Equity Land Loan
$3.251MM $14.804MM
21.8% (148.9%)
Before-tax return at discount rate of 20%
Current-dollar land cost = $4.332MM
Land loan is $30MM, at 10% interest only, due in 1995
102
Notes:
1
2
3
But it is rather high in terms of real volume at
approximately 1,245 units. The overall gross margin of 19%
is vulnerable, as well, to subdued expectations of price
appreciation and absorption in the project's final phase.
It is important to note, however, that ARCORP's perspective
on the Palace is likely to span a longer term than it would
if ARCORP was contemplating the development of only this 40-
acre parcel. This issue is discussed in more depth in the
next chapter.
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CHAPTER V
RECOMMENDATIONS
The financial analysis in the preceding chapter
suggests that perhaps the costs to develop the Palace are
too high relative to the prices that can be achieved in the
competitive environment of the waterfront residential
market. Is ARCORP proposing to over-improve the site, given
the market constraints on price at that location? Or will
the supply of high-quality luxury units at the Palace create
the desired demand at corresponding high prices? ARCORP's
special circumstances cast another light on this issue.
As the owner of the entire 367-acre parcel, ARCORP is
likely to view the return from the Palace differently than
it would if it was the owner of just the forty-acre Palace
parcel. This is understandable. ARCORP's objectives
regarding the Palace development are longer-range than those
of the typical developer of a single parcel. In this, the
first stage of its master plan for the mixed-use development
of the property, ARCORP is seeking to set a precedent or
tone for the development of subsequent stages. ARCORP may
therefore accept a lower return in this first stage, if it
feels that the quality design and construction of the Palace
will generate a positive externality for the rest of the
site. In that case, it will expect to realize higher
returns (i.e. rents and sales prices) in future stages of
the development of Port Imperial as a result.
In this final section, several issues are identified
which ARCORP should address before undertaking the
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development of the Palace. In addition to issues which were
discussed in previous sections, these will impact the
financial feasibilty and marketability of the project. The
first of these issues concerns the retail component of the
Palace. The development program calls for 46,400 rentable
square feet of retail space (exclusive of the ferry
terminal) which paradoxically is too small, yet too large an
amount to be viable. That is, the retail space is not large
enough to become a destination shopping area, but may be too
much to thrive on the Palace residents' demand alone.
Further, if the build-out of the Palace is delayed, ARCORP
will have to continue to subsidize the retail tenants
indefinitely.
In addition to providing essential services to the
residents of the Palace, the retail component has another
purpose to fulfill. It really should generate activity at
the site and contribute to the establishment of a lively,
community environment. If the retail businesses are
unsuccessful, it will dampen the atmosphere at the complex.
In view of this, perhaps ARCORP should seriously reconsider
broadening the mix of uses at the Palace, in particular,
expanding the retail space to make it a more significant
component. In the "big" picture, the Palace may be
primarily a residential component of ARCORP's long-range
mixed-use development strategy for the entire 367 acres.
However, the Palace is a large-scale development in its own
right. As such, it may be appropriate to regard it as a
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microcosm of the overall planned development, in which a
broader mix is required to create a more vital atmosphere.
Enlarging the Palace's retail component to make it
effectively a destination shopping area would require a
modification of the design. The expanded retail space would
likely be more self-contained, as well as more viable
economically; hence, it should be easier to finance with a
permanent loan. However, this may also inject an element of
contradiction into the Palace marketing strategy, as it
relates to access. A conflict would exist between marketing
a secure and exclusive residential image, based on the ferry
serving as a private taxi for residents only, and bringing
non-residents to the site via the ferry to boost retail
sales. Drawing non-residents to shop and dine in
restaurants at the site would also raise an issue concerning
parking. The site plan would probably have to be revised to
accommodate additional parking and traffic.
Obviously, the promotion of a viable retail component
at the Palace raises some complicated marketing and design
issues. ARCORP would be well-advised to solicit the counsel
of an experienced retail developer on these matters. ARCORP
should also consider leasing the entire retail area to an
experienced retail developer and/or operator to manage, who
in turn could sublet the space to individual tenants.
In regard to another marketing issue, there appears to
be a dichotomy of opinion within ARCORP's organization as to
the relative importance of the Palace's principal target
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markets. On one side, it is believed that the marketing
should focus primarily on attracting Manhattan dwellers.
This is considered necessary to achieve ARCORP's rapid
absorption goal, as presumably Manhattan residents can
relocate more quickly from an apartment or condominium in
the City than their New Jersey counterparts. On the other
side, it is felt that the project is too large to target
just one market; thus, several New Jersey market segments
are regarded as important to target. Two such markets are
empty-nesters in Northern New Jersey and present condominium
owners in the area, whose units have appreciated
considerably and who now are in a strong position to upgrade
their accommodations. ARCORP must reach a consensus about
its marketing strategy, in order to make final design
decisions regarding unit mix and size and to plan an
effective marketing campaign.
ARCORP also must address the issue of common area fees
and real estate taxes in order to prepare the condominium
offering plan for the Palace. In particular, the
maintenance costs of the complex may not be absolutely
variable with the number of units developed on the site.
Given the scope of services which ARCORP proposes to provide
for the site, there is likely to be a threshold level of
fixed costs which is disproportionately high relative to the
784 units to be developed initially. ARCORP probably will
not be able to pass on the full costs to service the
development to the first-phase residents.
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Inherent in any large-scale phased development is the
risk of downturns in the regional or national economy. If
the economy slows and market conditions warrant postponing
the build-out of the Palace, ARCORP faces the risk of having
to subsidize services at the development for an indefinite
period. ARCORP should attempt to quantify the cost of this
subsidy and to incorporate it in the feasibilty analysis of
the project.
Lastly, ARCORP should consider another risk that is
inherent in any large-scale residential development and its
impact on the marketability of the Palace units.
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threat of internal competition from resales. The
is especially vulnerable to this threat since the
is likely to appeal to speculators in the early
when sales prices are restrained in order to
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prices up - have been frozen out of the building by a resale
ban. Sales agreements incorporate a no-resale clause based
108
on time and on the percentage of the residential space in
the building that has been sold. 1 This may be a mechanism
which ARCORP will want to investigate. However, ARCORP may
not have the liberty to cut off speculative demand at the
Palace. This component of demand may assert too great an
effect on the rate of sales in the early phases; so much so,
that the positive financial impact of sales to speculators
may outweigh the potential negative impact of competition
from resales.
It remains to be seen whether or not ARCORP can indeed
create the setting for such a unique design as the Palace.
Certainly, the New York metropolitan area is the optimum
location for such a prodigious undertaking. Given the sheer
size and diversity of the New York market, a submarket is
more likely to exist there for the Palace development than
in any other area of the country.
It is evident from Arthur Imperatore's close
involvement in all decisions affecting ARCORP's plans for
the property, that he has a deep, personal involvement in
the outcome of this development. Under his direction, high
standards have been set for the the transformation of this
long-neglected stretch of vacant land into a European-style
city. ARCORP has already accomplished a great deal toward
facilitating the site's metamorphose. Its successful
efforts to obtain access to Manhattan via the ferry and
zoning for high-density urban development have created value
for the property and deserve praise.
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ARCORP's "city" will only thrive, however, if an
inhabitable setting is established at the site. The rate at
which the rest of the property can be developed to create
this setting is limited by two factors. One of these of
course is market conditions. The other relates to ARCORP's
capacity to undertake multiple developments, to assume risk
and to commit capital and time. Perhaps it would be to
ARCORP's advantage to sell or ground-lease parcels to other
developers, in order to spur the transformation of the site
as a whole. The presence of ARCORP's and other developers'
projects at the site should be mutually beneficial. Rather
than competing against one another, they should collectively
enhance the marketability of this location. Moreover, other
developments at the site would no doubt rely upon ARCORP's
ferry service. The increased volume of ferry passengers
should in turn increase the profitability of that operation.
Overall, the development of ARCORP's waterfront
property is an exciting prospect. Through the bold and
creative efforts of ARCORP and other developers, the dormant
eighteen-mile west bank of the Hudson has the chance to
become a beautiful and pleasurable waterfront, of which New
Jersey's residents can be proud.
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West New York, New Jersey
Exhibit 1A DEVELOPMENT ASSUMPTIONS
TOTAL PROGRAM: EFFICIENCY FACTORS:
Condominium 2,979,000 gsf* Condominium 81%
Retail 41,000 gsf Retail 80%
Total GSF
*incl. 19,000 gsf
Parking
UNITS:
Condominium
Retail
Parking
SF/UNIT:
Condominium
Parking
SITE:
Acres
Upland
Under Water
Upland SF
3,020,000 gsf
of retail
870,600 gsf
2,002
60,000
2,902
units
gsf
cars
1,205 nsf/unit
300 gsf/car
40
25
15
1,089,000
ESCALATION FACTORS:
Condo Prices
Parking Rents
Retail Rent
Hard Costs
Soft Costs
Pking Oper. Exp.
Condo Common Area
Fees & RE Taxes
DEVELOPER'S FEE:
acres
acres
acres
sf
6%
5%
4%
4%
0%
4%
2%
2%
RENTABLE/SALEABLE AREA:
Condominium 2,413,770
Retail 48,000
MARKET PRICES/RENTS:
Condominium
Retail
Pking Monthly
Pking Transient
ABSORPTION:
GROSS SELLOUT: $610
COMMISSION RSDNTL:
RETAIL:
Lease Term
Vacancy
ANNUAL OPERATING COSTS:
Condo Common Area
Fees & RE Taxes
Retail Oper. Exp.
Pking Oper. Exp.
CONSTRUCTION LOAN:
Fee
Interest
LAND LOAN:
Amount
Fee
Interest
$200
$15
$100
$3.00
nsf
rsf
per nsf
per rsf
per mo
per day
250 units/yr
,742,703
3%
5 yrs
10%
$12,000
$0
$1.50
per unit
per gsf
per gsf
1%
10%
$30,000,000
0.50%
10%
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Exhibit 1B PROJECT COST ESTIMATES
COSTS NOTES
Land & Exp. to Date $4,332,000 Not financed
HARD COSTS: Estimates provided by ARCORP's construction staff
$95 per gsf
$70 per gsf
Incl. retail in rsdtl bldgs
No tenant allowance
$12,000 per space
$40 per gsf
Landscaping
Grading/Landfill
Utilities
Sewers
Bulkhead
Piles
$10,000,000
$9.20 per sf of upland area
$1,000,000
$5,000 per unit
$4,000 per unit
$1,300,000
$1,460,000
$365,000 per crescent
Road thru Site
off-site Road
Sales Offices:
NY pier
NJ on-site
$1,565,000
$1,000,000
$2,000,000
$4,500,000
Allowance: $2.5MM per crescent
All are installed in ph 1
Pd on a per-unit-occpd basis
Allowance
All are driven in ph. 1
2.5 miles; 90 ft wide
River Rd intersection &
deceleration Lane
Allowance
Allowance
SOFT COSTS:
Architect
Engineering Consultant
Legal/Accounting
Marketing
Const Pd Insurance
Const Pd RE Taxes
AnnI Common Area Fees &
RE Taxes on unsold units
$7,500,000
$3,900,000
$2,600,000
$39,195,000
Based on 1% of hard costs
Based on 1/2% of hard costs
$13,200 per unit
As per Joseph Dugan of
11 11 11 II S
If 11 11 II I
ARCORP
Includes permits/closing costs
6.5% of gross sellout
3% commissions; 3.5% adv.
Paid at begin. of each phase
Paid at end of construction
of each phase
Assumes 50% tax abatement
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Condominium
Retail
Parking
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Exhibit 1C
DETAIL OF ASSUMPTIONS
1. Condominium Prices and Absorption:
Prices begin at $200 per nsf in 1987 and escalate 6% p.a.
Average price of 2,002 units: $253 per nsf
$304,865 per unit
2. Retail Lease:
As per ARCORP's marketing consultant, all retail leases
will be triple net. As such, all operating expenses, real
estate taxes and common area charges are passed on to the
tenant. ARCORP will own the retail space and lease all
but the 2,000 gsf ferry terminal which it will operate.
3. Carrying Costs of Unsold Units:
Annual condominium common area fee: $4.50 per nsf
average unit = 1,205 nsf average fee per unit = $5,423
Annual real estate taxes: $5.45 per nsf
1987 initial price = $200 per nsf or $241,000 per unit
Assessed at 48.5% = $116,885
Tax Rate: $112.22 per $1,000 assessed value
Average annual tax per unit = $13,117
With 50% tax abatement = $ 6,558
Avg. annual common area fees and r.e. taxes: $11,981
Say: $12,000
4. Hard Costs:
Condominium hard costs include 5% general conditions and
5% contingency. Retail hard cost estimate includes no
tenant allowance.
5. Construction Manager's Fee:
It is assumed that ARCORP's construction staff will
manage construction; thus, no fee is budgeted.
6. Developer's Fee:
2% of condominium gross sales
This fee is deferred and paid on a per-unit-sold basis.
7. Marketing:
6.5% of gross sellout: $39,300,000
3.0% commissions: $18,300,000 3.5% mkt/adv: $21,000,000
8. Architect's Fee:
As per Joseph Dugan of ARCORP, $1.5 million of Bofill's
$7.5 million fee will be paid in 1986, and another $5
million will be paid to him by groundbreaking in 1987.
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8. Architect's Fee (cont.):
The remaining $1 million will be paid over the next three
development phases.
9. Engineering Fees:
Also as per Joseph Dugan, $3.9 million is budgeted. Of
this amount, $3,000,000 is estimated to be spent by
groundbreaking, and the remaining $900,000 is to be spent
over the life of the project.
10. Legal/Accounting Fees:
Again, as per Joseph Dugan, $2.6 million is budgeted, of
which $1.4 million is to be spent by groundbreaking. The
remaining $1.2 million is to be spent over the life of
the project.
11. Sewer Hook-Up Fees:
Estimated at $4,000 per unit to be paid on a per-unit-
occupied basis.
12. Parking:
Monthly: 1 space per unit sold
Transient: 1 visitor per week (or 13 per qtr) per unit
sold.
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Exhibit 2 ANNUAL INCOME & EXPENSE PROJECTION
3---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
YEAR: 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1991 1995
PRICES/RENTS
Condoriniu
Retail
Pking Monthly
Pki ng Transient
OPERATING EXPENSES
Corron area fees
and r.e. taxes
an unsold units
Parking
HRRD COSTS
Condoriniu m
Retai 1
Parki ng
$200 $212
$15.00
$100
$3.00
$95.00
5?0.00
$12,000
$225
$15.60
$105
$3.15
$238
$16.22
$110
$3.31
$252
$16.8 ?
$1.16
53.47?
$268
$1?.55
$122
$3.65
$281
$18.25
$128
$3.83
$301
$18.98
5131
$4.02
$319
$19.74
S11
$.22
$12,000 $12,210 $12,185 $12,?31 $12,989 $13,219 $13,511 $13,?81$1.50 $1.56 $1.62 $1.69 $1.?5 $1.82 $1.90 $1.9?
$98.80 $102.?5 $106.86 $111.11 $115.58 $120.21 $125.01 $130.01
$72.80
$12,180 $12,979 $13,198 $11,038 $11,600 $15,181 $15,?91 $16,123
H
Ha
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Exhibit 3 ABSORPTION PROJECTION
OTR: 86/3 86/4 87/1 87/2 87/3 87/1 88/1 88/2 88/3 88/1
Units Available
Phase 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 364 154 455 148
Phase 2
Phase 3
Phase I
Units Sold per Otr. 0 0 0 21 63 63 63 63 63 63
Cum. Units Sold:
Phase 1 0 0 0 21 84 I? 210 273 336 399
Phase 2
Phase 3
Phase I
H- - ------------------- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -n- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Total Cum. Units Sold 0 0 0 21 81 147 210 273 336 3990
Exhibit i CARRVING COSTS OF UNSOLD UNITS
OTR: 86/3 86/4 87/1 87/2 87/3 87/4 88/1 88/2 88/3 88/1
Avg. Units Unsold 0 0 0 0 0 0 164 122 423 416
Carry Cost per Unit 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,000 3,000 3,000 3,000
Total Carry Cost 0 0 0 0 0 0 164,000 366,000 1,269,000 1,248,000
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Exhibit 3 ABSORPTION PROJECTION
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
QTR: 89/1 89/2 89/3 89/1 90/1 90/2 90/3 90/1 91/1 91/2
Units Available
Phase 1 385 322 259 196 133 70 ?
Phase 2 0 V74 292
Phase 3
Phase I
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Units Sold per Qtr. 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63Cum. Units Sold:
Phase 1 462 525 588 651 714 ??? 781
Phase 2 56 119 182 215
Phase 3
Phase I
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Cun. Units Sold .462 525 588 651 711 ??810 903 966 1029
Exhibit I CARRYING COSTS OF UNSOLD UNITS
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
QTR: 89/1 89/2 89/3 89/4 90/1 90/2 90/3 90/4 91/1 91/2
Avg. Units Unsold 353 290 227 161 101 38 0 0 302 260
Carry Cost per Unit 3,060 3,060 3,060 3,060 3,121 3,121 3,121 3,121 1,061 3,181
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Carry Cost 1,080,180 887,400 691,620 50 1, 810 315,211 118,606 0 0 320,962 827,712
H
H
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Exhibit 3 ABSORPTION PROJECTION
OTR: 91/3 91/1 92/1 92/2 92/3 92/q 93/1 93/2 93/3 93/4
Unit- Available
Phase 1
Phase 2 229 166 103 40
Phase 3 0 0 ?1 262 199 136
Phase I
Units Sold per Qtr. 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63
Cun. Units Sold:
Phase 1
Phase 2 308 371 434 474
Phase 3 23 86 149 212 275 338 101
Phase I
Total Cum. Units Sold 1092 1155 1218 1281 1341 1407 1470 1533 1596 1659
Exhibit 4 CARRYING COSTS OF UNSOLD UNITS
OTR: 91/3 91/4 92/1 92/2 92/3 92/4 93/1 93/2 93/3 93/4
Rvg. Units Unsold
Carry Cost per Unit
19?
3,184
131
3,181
71
3,247?
20
2,165 3,21?
0
3,24?
272
1,104
230
3,312
16?
3,312
104
3,312
Total Carry Cost 627,174 426,606 230,558 13,29? 0 0 300,80? 761,816 553,114 344,473
H-
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Exhibit 3 ABSORPTION PROJECTION
QTR: 91/1 91/2 94/3 94/4 95/1 95/2 TOTAL
Units Available
Phase 1 784
Phase 2 4
Phase 3 73 10 74
Phase 1 270 154 91 28 270
Units Sold per Qtr. 63 63 63 63 63 28
Cun. Units Sold:
Phase 1
Phase 2
Phase 3 164 474
Phase 4 53 116 179 242 270
H Total Cum. Units Sold 1?22 1785 1848 1911 1974 2002
tJ
Exhibit I CARRRYING COSTS OF UNSOLD UNITS
QTR: 94/1 91/2 94/3 94/4 95/1 95/2 TOTAL
Avg. Units Unsold 11 0 164 122 59 14
Carry Cost per Unit 3,378 3,378 1,126 3,378 1,149 3,446
Total Carry Cost 138,518 0 185,197 412,175 67,772 18,245
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Exhibit 5 CONDOMINIUM MET SALES PROJECTION
oTR: 86/3 86/4 8?/1 8?/2 87/3 8?/I 88/1 88/2 88/3 88/1
Cum. Units Closed 0 0 0 0 0 0 210 273 336 399
Units Closed per Otr 0 0 0 0 0 0 210 63 63 63
Gross Condo Sales 0 0 0 0 0 0 51,520,980 16,093,980 16,093,980 16,093,980
Less: Sewer Fees 0 0 0 0 0 0 810,000 252,000 252,000 252,000
Cormissions 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,515,629 182,819 482,819 182,819
Development Fee 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,030,420 321,880 321,880 321,880
Net Sales Proceeds 0 0 0 0 0 0 18,101,931 15,03?,281 15,03?,281 15,037,281
H
t~J
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Exhibit 5 CONDOMINIUM NET SALES PROJECTION
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
OTR: 89/1 89/2 89/3 89/4 90/1 90/2 90/3 90/4 91/1 91/2
Cum. Units Closed 162 525 588 651 71 ??? 781 781 966 1,029Units Closed per Otr 63 63 63 63 63 63 7 0 182 63
Gross Condo Sales 1?,059,619 17,059,619 17,059,619 17,059,619 18,083,196 18,083,196 2,009,241
Less: Sewer Fees 252,000 252,000 252,000 252,000 252,000 252,000 28,000
Comnissions 511,789 511,789 511,789 511,789 542,496 512,196 60,277
Development Fee 341,192 311,192 311,192 341,192 361,661 361,661 10,185
N S P e 55 19,-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Net Sales Proceeds 15,951,638 15,9531,638 15,951,638 15,951,638 16,927,036 16,927,036 1,880,782
0
0
0
0
53,325,336
728,000
1,599,760
1,066,50?
19,168,188
252,000
575,046
383,364
0 19,931,069 17,957,778
UL
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Exhibit 5 CON00MINIUM NET SALES PROJECTION
oTR: 91/3 91/4 92/1 92/2 92/3 92/1 93/1 93/2 93/3 93/4
Cun. Units Closed 1,092 1,155 1,218 1,258 1,258 1,258 1,1?0 1,533 1,596 1,659
Units Closed per Qtr 63 63 63 40 0 0 212 63 63 63
Gross Condo Sales 19,168,188 19,168,188 20,318,2?9 12,900,195 0 0 69,591,?18 21,53?,376 21,53?,3?6 21,53?,3?6
Less: Sewer Fees 252,000 252,000 252,000 160,000 0 0 818,000 252,000 252,000 252,000
Conissions 5?5,016 5?5,016 609,518 38?,015 0 0 2,08?,?52 616,121 616,121 646,121
Developnent Fee 383,361 383,361 106,366 258,010 0 0 1,391,831 430,?18 130,?18 130,?48
Net Sales Proceeds 1?,95?,??8 1?,95?,?78 19,050,365 12,095,1?0 0 0 65,261,132 20,208,50? 20,208,50? 20,208,50?
H
bi
Port Imperial
West New York, New Jersey
CONDOMINIUM NET SALES PROJECTION
arR:
Cum. Units Closed
Units Closed per Qtr
91/1
1,722
63
91/2
1,732
10
94/3 91/1
1,848 1,911
116 63
95/1
1,971
63
95/2
2,002
28
Gross Condo Sales 22,829,618 3,623,749 42,035,188 22,829,618 21,199,395 10,755,287
Less: Sewer Fees 252,000 10,000 161,000 252,000 252,000 112,000
Comissions 684,889 108,712 1,261,065 681,889 725,982 322,659
Development Fee 456,592 72,175 810,710 156,592 483,988 215,106
Net Sales Proceeds 21,436,137 3,102,561 39,169,713 21,136,137 22,737,126 10,105,522
TOTAL
610,712,703
8,008,000
18,322,281
12,214,854
572,197,568
Exhibit 5
H
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
-------------------------------------------
Exhibit 6 Supporting Calculations for Development Budget
QTR: 86/3 86/4 87/1 37/2 87/3 87/1 88/1 88/2 88/3 88/1 Total
SITE IMPROVEMENTS:
Grading/Landfill 500,000 500,000
Bulkhead 260,000 520,000 520,000
Utilities 2,002,000 4,004,000 4,001,000
Piles 1,160,000
On-site Road 313,000 1,252,000
Off-site Road 200,000 800,000
Total Sitework 2,762,000 6,997,000 6,576,000 16,335,000
CONDOMINIUM:
N-Mid Crescent 5,820,650 23,282,600 12,170,450 12,106,952
S-Mid Crescent 2,116,600 11,611,300 19,811,376 12,657,268 8,251,710
Central Arch 1,119,101 1,986,136 3,052,920 1,017,610
Total Condoriniun 5,820,650 25,399,200 23,811,750 33,037,732 17,643,701 11,30?,660 1,017,610 118,038,336
RETAIL 298,180 596,960 1,193,920 895,110 2,981,800
PARKING
N-Mid Crescent 801,600 1,603,200 3,206,400 2,500,992
S-Mid Crescent 936,000 1,916,880 3,893,760 2,920,320
Total Parking 801,600 1,603,200 1,112,100 1,11?,8?2 3,893,760 2,920,320 17,809,152
LANDSCAPING 2,500,000 2,500,000 5,000,000
SALES OFFICES:
NY Pier 200,000 100,000 800,000 600,000
NJ On-site 150,000 900,000 1,800,000 1,350,000
Total Sales Offices 650,000 1,300,000 2,600,000 1,950,000 6,500,000
TOTAL HARD COSTS 650,000 4,062,000 9,597,000 15,118,250 27,002,400 27,954,150 10,281,081 22,131,121 17,921,900 1,913,080 166,667,288
0-,
03
Port Imperial
West New York, Now Jersey
Exhibit ? DEVELOPMENT BUDGET PROJECTION
PHASE I
OTR: 86/3 86/4 87/1 87/2 87/3 87/1 88/1 88/2 88/3 88/4
LAND & EXP. TO DATE 1,332,000
HARD COSTS;
Sitework 2,762,000 6,997,000 6,576,000
Condominium 5,820,650 25,399,200 23,811,750 33,037,732 17,643,701 11,307,660 1,017,610
Retail 298,180 596,960 1,193,920 895,110
Parking 801,600 1,603,200 1,112,400 4,117,872 3,893,760 2,920,320
Landscaping 2,500,000 2,500,000
Sales Offices 650,000 1,300,000 2,600,000 1,950,000
Total Hard Costs 650,000 4,062,000 9,597,000 15,148,250 27,002,100 27,951,150 10,284,081 22,134,424 17,921,900 1,913,080
SOFT COSTS
Architect
Engineering
Legal/Rccting
Insurance
R.E. Taxes
Marketing
Common area fees
and r.e. taxes
on unsold units
Const. Loan Fee
Const. Interest
1,500,000
1,000,000
460,000
2,250,000
1,000,000
160,000
2,250,000
1,000,000
180,000
1,666,673
833,336
400,000 675,000 675,000 675,000 675,000 675,000 675,000 675,000 675,000 675,000
0 0 0 0
1,660,000
0
0 0 161,000 366,000 1,269,000 1,248,000
137,081 1,139,943 1,884,171 2,358,010 2,207,099 2,382,992
Total Soft Costs 3,360,000 4,385,000 6,071,673 2,335,000 1,112,081 1,814,943 2,723,1?1 3,399,010 4,151,099 5,139,329
TOTAL COSTS excluding 1,010,000 8,41?,000 15,668,673 17,183,250 28,114,481 29,769,093 43,007,255 25,533,164 22,072,999 7,052,409
land A exp. to date
Ha
'0
Port Imperial
West New York, Now Jersey
Exhibit ? DEVELOPMENT BUOGET PROJECTION
PHASE 2
QTR: 89/1 89/2 89/3 89/1 90/1 90/2 90/3 90/1 91/1 91/2
LAND & EXP. TO DATE
HARD COSTS:
Sitework
Condominiu 8,398,825 33,595,301 17,561,180 17,169,556
Retail
Parking 1,087,968 2,175,937 ,351,871 3,391,162
.Landscaping 2,500,000
Sales Offices
Total Hard Costs 0 0 0 0 0 9,186,794 35,??1,238 21,913,051 23,361,018 0
SOFT COSTS
Architect 125,000 125,000 125,000 125,000
H Engineering 150,000 150,000
LA Legal/Rccting 200,000 200,000
0 Insurance 905,351
R.E. Taxes 452,676
Narketing 6?5,000 675,000 675,000 600,000 600,000 600,000 600,000 600,000 600,000 600,000
Comon area fees
and r.o. taxes
on unsold units 1,080,180 88?,100 691,620 501,810 315,211 118,606 0 0 320,962 827,712
Const. Loan Fee 1,100,000
Const. Interest 2,007,547 1,620,118 1,221,282 822,116 123,550 151,133 319,855 1,210,257 1,837,215 1,889,931
Total Soft Costs 3,762,727 3,182,518 2,590,902 1,921,256 2,913,791 2,250,390 1,011,855 1,965,257 3,210,853 3,317,673
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------=
TOTAL COSTS excluding 3.762,727 3,182,548 2,590,902 1,921,256 2,913,791 11,737,181 36,816,092 23,878,311 26,571,871 3,317,673
land & exp. to date
Port Imperial
West New York, New Jersey
Exhibit ? DEVELOPMENT BUDGET PROJECTION
PHASE 3 PHASE I
QTR: 91/3 91/1 92/1 92/2 92/3 92/1 93/1 93/2 93/3 93/1
LAND & EXP. TO DATE
HARD COSTS:
Si tework
Condoninium 9,081,169 36,336,677 18,991,172 18,895,072 1,103,120
Retail
Parking 916,069 1,892,139 3,784,277 2,951,736
Landscaping 2,500,000
Sales Offices
H Total Hard Costs 0 0 0 10,030,239 38,228,816 22,7?8,149 24,316,808 0 0 4,103,120
Lj SOIFT COSTS
Hj Architect 125,000 125,000 125,000 125,000 125,000 125,000
Engineering 150,000 150,000 150,000 150,000
Legal/Accting 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000
Insurance 953,813 114,534
R.E. Taxes 1?6,922
Marketing 600,000 600,000 600,000 600,000 600,000 500,000 500,000 500,000 500,000 500,000
Connon area fees
and r.e. taxes
on unsold units 627,171 426,606 230,558 43,29? 0 0 300,807 761,816 553,111 311,73
Const. Loan Fee 1,120,000 520,000
Const. Interest 1,111,231 760,479 365,190 112,179 335,216 1,317,173 1,935,196 1,819,185 912,280 506,339
Total Soft Costs 2,368,108 1,787,085 2,790,749 2,181,619 1,060,246 1,912,173 3,213,221 3,111,301 2,960,125 2,210,346
TOTAL COSTS excluding 2,368,408 1,787,085 2,790,719 12,211,858 39,289,062 21,720,922 27,560,033 3,111,301 2,960,425 6,613,466
land & exp. to date
Port Imperial
West New York, New Jersey
Exhibit ? DEVELOPMENT BUDGET PROJECTION
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PHASE I
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
QTR: 94/1 91/2 91/3 91/4 95/1 95/2 TOTAL
LAND &: EXP. TO DATE 1,332,000
HARD COSTS:
Sitework 16,335,000
Condorinium 18,316,981 9,571,?85 9,158,190 319,826,666
Retail 2,981,800
Parking 38,393,611
Landscaping 10,000,000
Sales Offices 6,500,000
Total Hard Costs 18,316,981 9,571,785 9,158,190 0 0 0 394,040,080
SOFT COSTS
Architect 125,000 125,000 ?,500,000
Engineering 3,900,000
Legal/Accting 2,600,000
Insurance 3,940,401
R.E. Taxes 207,26? 1,970,200
Marketing 500,000 500,000 500,000 500,000 500,000 300,000 21,000,000
Coron area fees
and r.e. taxes
on unsold units 138,518 0 185,197 112,175 67,772 48,215 11,933,375
Const. Loan Fee 1,100,000
Const. Interest 294,820 611,571 912,608 792,000 225,516 0 31,015,211
------------------------------------------------------------ 
----------
Total Soft Costs 1,058,338 1,266,571 1,805,073 1,701,176 793,319 318,215 91,289,187
--- --- --- --- -- --- --- --- -- ------
TOTAL COSTS excluding 19,375,319 10,811,360 10,963,563 1,701,176 793,319 318,215 185,329,26?
land & exp. to date
LA)
t%)
Port Imperial
West New York, New Jersey
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Exhibit 8 CONDOMINIUM DEVELOPMENT PERIOD CASH FLOW PROJECTION
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
QTR: 86/3 86/4 87/1 87/2 8?/3 87/1 88/1 88/2 88/3 88/1
Net Sales Proceeds 0 0 0 0 0 0 18,101,931 15,037,281 15,037,281 15,037,281
Interest 0 0 0 0 137,081 1,139,943 1,884,171 2,358,010 2,207,099 2,382,992
Total Costs 1,010,000 8,147,000 15,668,673 17,183,250 28,114,481 29,769,093 13,007,255 25,533,164 22,072,999 7,052,409
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Otrly. Cash Flow (1,010,000) (8,147,000)(15,668,6?3)(17,183,250)(28,14,181)C29,769,093) 5,097,676 (10,196,183) (?,035,718) 7,984,872
Loan Commitrent 166,000,000 148,516,750 120,402,269 90,633,175 4?,625,921 22,092,457 19,457
Cumulative Advances 17,483,250 45,597,731 75,366,825 118,374,079 113,907,513 165,980,513 166,000,000
Loan Advance 17,183,250 28,114,481 29,769,093 43,007,255 25,533,164 22,072,999 19,457
Loan Repayment 0 0 0 48,104,931 15,037,291 15,037,281 15,037,281
Loan Balance 17,183,250 45,597,731 75,366,825 70,269,118 80,765,331 87,801,050 72,783,226
Net itrly Cash Flow (1,010,000) (8,117,000)(15,668,673) 0 0 0 0 0 0 (?,032,951)
Cun. Condo Cash Flow (1,010,000) (12,457,000) (28,125,673) (28,125,673) (28,125,673) (28, 125,673) (28,125,673) (28, 125,673) (28,125,6?3) (35, 158,624)
NOTE: Total costs exclude land 8: exp. to date
Port Imperial
West New York, New Jersey
Exhibit 8 CONDOMINIUM DEVELOPMENT PERIOD CASH FLOW PROJECTION
OTR: 89/1 89/2 89/3 89/4 90/1 90/2 90/3 90/4 91/1 91/2
Net Sales Proceeds 15,954,638 15,954,638 15,954,638 15,954,638 16,927,036 16,927,036 1,880,782 0 19,931,069 17,957,??8
Interest 2,007,547 1,620,148 1,221,282 822,416 123,550 151,433 319,855 1,240,25? 1,837,215 1,889,931
Total Costs 3,762,727 3,182,548 2,590,902 1,924,256 2,913,791 11,737,181 36,816,092 23,878,311 26,571,871 3,317,673
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Otrly. Cash Flow 12,191,911 12,772,090 13,363,736 14,030,382 14,013,215 5,189,852 (34,935,310)(23,878,311) 23,356,198 14,640,105
Loan Comnitment 0 0 0 0 110,000,000 108,125,000 97,205,816 60,389,724 36,511,413 9,936,513
Cumulative Rdvances 166,000,000 166,0100,000 166,000,000 166,000,000 1,575,000 12,794,181 49,610,276 73,488,587 100,063,457 103,381,130
Loan Rdvance 0 0 0 0 1,575,000 11,219,181 36,816,092 23,878,311 26,571,871 3,317,673
Loan Repayrent 15,954,638 15,954,638 15,954,638 15,954,638 8,964,675 (0) (0) 0 18,932,417 17,598,623
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Loan Balance 56,82,588 10,873,950 24,919,312 8,964,675 1,575,000 12,794,184 49,610,276 73,488,587 51,131,010 36,850,061
Net Otrly Cash Flow (3,762,727) (3,182,548) (2,590,902) (1,921,256) 6,623,5?1 16,109,036 1,880,782 0 998,621 359,156
Cun. Condo Cash Flow (38,921,351) (12,103,899) (11,694,800) (16,619,056)C39,995,186)(23,586,449)(21,705,667) (21,705,667)(20,707,016)(20,347,890)
NOTE: Total costs exclude land & exp. to date
Port Imperial
West New York, New Jersey
Exhibit 8 CONDOMINIUM DEVELOPMENT PERIOD CASH FLOW PROJECTION
OTR: 91/3 91/1 92/1 92/2 92/3 92/4 93/1 93/2 93/3 93/1
Net Sales Proceeds 17,957,778 17,957,778 19,050,365 12,095,470 0 0 65,261,132 20,208,50? 20,208,50? 20,208,50?
Interest 1,111,231 760,479 365,190 112,479 335,216 1,317,173 1,935,196 1,849,185 912,280 506,339
Total Costs 2,368,108 1,787,085 2,790,719 12,211,858 39,289,062 24,720,922 27,560,033 3,111,301 2,960,125 6,613,166
Otrly. Cash Flow 15,589,370 16,170,691 16,259,616 (119,388)(39,289,062)(21,720,922) 37,701,099 17,097,206 17,218,082 13,565,011
Loan Cornitment 6,618,870 1,250,162 112,000,000 110,105,000 98,590,113 59,301,080 31,580,158 7,020,125 55,908,821 52,918,399
Cumulative Advances 105,719,538 107,536,623 1,595,000 13,109,858 52,698,920 ??,419,843 104,979,875 108,091,176 111,051,601 117,695,067
Loan Advance 2,368,108 1,787,085 1,595,000 11,811,858 39,289,062 21,720,922 27,560,033 3,111,301 2,960,125 6,613,166
Loan RepayMent 17,598,623 17,598,623 5,808,30? (0) 0 0 62,000,925 19,198,082 19,198,082 11,010,325
Loan Balance 21,619,816 5,808,308 1,595,000 13,109,858 52,698,920 ??,119,843 42,978,950 26,892,170 10,651,513 6,287,651
F Net Qtrly Cash Flow 359,156 359,156 12,016,309 11,695,170 0 0 3,263,20? 1,010,125 1,010,125 9,198,182
U1 Cum. Condo Cash Flow (19,988,735)(19,629,579) (?,583,271) 1,112,199 1,112,199 1,112,199 7,375,106 8,385,831 9,396,257 18,594,439
NOTE: Total costs exclude land & exp. to date
Port Imperial
West New York, New Jersey
CONDOMINIUM DEVELOPMENT PERIOD CASH FLOW PROJECTION
oTR: 94/1 94/2 94/3 9-/4 95/1 95/2
Net Sales Proceeds 21,136,137 3,402,561 39,169,713 21,136,137 22,737,426 10,105,522
Interest 291,820 641,571 912,608 792,000 225,516 0
Total Costs 19,375,319 10,811,360 10,963,563 1,704,176 ?93,319 318,245
Otrly. Cash Flow 2,060,818 (?,138,798) 28,506,150 19,731,962 21,914,107 9,757,278
Loan Comritment
Cumulative Advances
16,304,933 26,929,611 16,088,254 5,121,691 3,120,515 2,627,19?
137,0?0,387 117,911,716 158,875,309 160,579,185 161,372,801 161,721,018
Loan Advance 19,375,319 10,811,360 10,963,563 1,701,176 793,319 318,215
Loan Repaymrnt 0 0 31,575,7?1 17,118,910 1,210,709 318,215
Loan Balance 25,662,973 36,504,332 15,892,125 417,390 (0) 0
Net Dtrly Cash Flow 21,136,137 3,102,561 7,893,913 4,287,22? 21,196,717 9,757,278
Cum. Condo Cash Flow 40,030,575 13,133,136 51,327,079 55,611,307 ??,111,023 86,868,301
NOTE: Total costs exclude land & exp. to date
TOTrAL
572,197,568
485,329,267
86,868,301
435,257,671
135,257,671
Exhibit 8
L0
ON
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Port IrpQrial
West Now York, New Jersey
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Exhibit 9 PARKING & RETAIL INCOME & EXPENSE PROJECTION
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
OTR: 86/3 86/4 87/1 87/2 8?/3 87/1 88/1 88/2 88/3 88/1
PARKING:
Avg Units Occupied 0 0 0 0 0 0 200 242 305 368
Gross Income:
Ouarterly 0 0 0 0 0 0 20,000 72,600 91,500 110,400
Transient 0 0 0 0 0 0 2,600 9,438 11,895 14,352
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Gross Income 0 0 0 0 0 0 22,600 82,038 103,395 124,752
Oper Exp & RE Taxes 0 0 0 0 0 0 25,050 75,150 162,900 162,900
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Net operating Income 0 0 0 0 0 0 (2,450) 6,888 (59,505) (38,148)
------------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------
RETAIL:
Net Operating Income 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NOTE: Triple Net Lease based on net sf
Less 2,000 gsf ferry terminal
Vacancy: 102
5 yr. lease; 2 yrs. free rent
Port Imperial
West New York, New Jersey
Exhibit 9 PARKING & RETAIL INCOME & EXPENSE PROJECTION
OTR: 89/1 89/2 89/3 89/4 90/1 90/2 90/3 90/4 91/1 91/2
PARKING:
Avg Units Occupied 131 491 557 620 683 746 781 784 956 998
Gross Income:
Ouarterly 135,765 155,610 175,155 195,300 225,902 216,740 259,308 259,308 331,851 316,593
Transient 17,649 20,229 22,809 25,389 29,367 32,076 :33,710 33,710 13,111 15,057
Total Gross Incore 153,111 175,839 198,264 220,689 255,270 278,816 293,018 293,018 371,991 391,650
Oper Exp & RE Taxes 169,416 169,416 169,116 169,416 176,193 176,193 176,193 176,193 285,237 285,23?
Net operating Incore (16,002) 6,123 28,848 51,273 79,077 102,623 116,825 116,825 89,754 106,113
03
RETAIL:
Net Operating Incore 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 132,300 132,300 132,300
NOTE: Triple Net Lease based on net sf
Less 2,000 gsf ferry terminal
Vacancy: 102
5 yr. lease; 2 yrs. free rent
Port Inperial
West New York, New Jersey
Exhibit 9 PARKING & RETAIL INCOME & EXPENSE PROJECTION
aTR: 91/3 91/4 92/1 92/2 92/3 92/1 93/1 93/2 93/3 93/1
PARKING:
Rvg Units Occupied 1,061 1,121 1,18? 1,258 1,258 1,258 1,160 1,502 1,565 1,628
Gross Incore:
Quarterly
Transient
368,472 390,351 432,812 158,732 158,732 458,732 558,839 575,092 599,214 623,336
17,901 50,716 56,269 59,635 59,635 59,635 72,619 71,762 ??,898 81,031
Total Gross Income 116,373 111,09? 189,111 518,36? 518,36? 518,36? 631,188 619,854 677,112 704,370
Oper Exp & RE Taxes 285,23? 285,23? 296,64? 296,61? 296,61? 296,61? 397,207 397,20? 397,20? 39?,20?
Net operating Incore 131,136 155,859 192,164 221,720 221,720 221,?20 231,281 252,618 279,905 307,163
P
RETAIL:
Net Operating Income 132,300 132,300 132-300 132,300 132,300 132,300 132,300 132,300 132,300 160,963
NOTE: Triple Net Lease based on net st
Less 2,000 gsf ferry terminal
Vacancy: 102
5 yr. lease; 2 yrs. free rent
Port Imperial
West New York, New Jersey
Exhibit 9 PARKING & RETAIL INCOME & EXPENSE PROJECTION
OTR: 91/1 91/2 94/3 91/1 95/1 95/2 TOTAL
PARKING:
Avg Units Occupied 1,691 1,?32 1,838 1,880 1,913 2,002
Gross Incore:
Quarterly 6?9,831 696,314 ?38,?18 ?55,814 820,199 815,105
Transient 88,3?8 90,521 96,03? 98,256 106,626 109,861
Total Gross Incore ?68,208 ?86,831 831,?85 851,0?0 926,825 951,968
Oper Exp & RE Taxes 113,095 113,095 113,095 113,095 429,619 129,619
Net operating Incore 355,113 3?3,?39 121,690 110,9?5 19?,206 525,319
0
RETAIL:
Net Operating Income 160,963 160,963 191,?10 191,710 191,?10 191,?10
NOTE: Triple Net Lease based on net sf
Less 2,000 gsf ferry terninal
Vacancy: 102
5 yr. lease; 2 yrs. free rent
Port Imperial
West New York, New Jersey
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Exhibit 10 BEFORE-TAX DISCOUNTED CASH FLON ANALYSIS
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
clrR: 86/3 86/1 87Y1 8?/2 8?/3 8?/14 88/1 88/2 88/3 88/1
(1,010,000) (8,117,000)(15,668,6?3)
0 0 0
0 0
(1,332,000) (1,010,000) (8,11?,000)(15,668,6?3)
0 (1,010,000) (8,117,000)(15,668,673)
Before-Tax NPV 9 202 and IRR
(1,081,121) 19.42 Initial outflow equal
3,250,879 21.82 Initial outflow equal
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 0 0 (?,032,951)
(2,150) 6,888 (59,505) (38,118)
0 0 0 0
0 (2,150) 6,888 (59,505) (?,071,099)
0 (2,150) 6,888 (59,505) (?,071,099)
s current-dollar investment in the land
s zero
Curulative Cash Flow C4,010,000)C12,157,000)(28,125,673)C28,125,673)C28,125,673)C28,125,673)C28,128,123)(28,121,235)C28,180,710)C35,251,839)
Land-L--n0------------------------------------------ 
---------------------------------------Land Loan 30,000,000
Land Loan D. S.
Net Cash Flow:
(1,332,000)
0
Before-Tax NPV 8 202
10,171,875
11,803,875
25,810,000
25,810,000
and IRR
37. 12
-148.92
0 (750,000) (?50,000) (?50,000) (?50,000) (50,000) (?50,000) (?50,000) (?50,000) (?50,000)
(9,197,000)(16,118,673)
(9,197,000)(16,118,673)
(750,000) (?50,000) (?50,000) (?52,450) (?13,112) (809,505) (7,821,099)(?50,000) (P50,000) (?50,000) (?52,150) (?13,112) (809,505) (?,821,099)
Initial outflow equals current-dollar investment in the land
Initial outflow equals zero
221,32? (525,6?3) (1,275,673) (2,025,673) (2,778,123) (3,521,235) (1,330,740)(12,151,839)Curulative Cash Flow 25,810,000 16,613,000
Condominium CF
Parking NOI
Retail NOI
Net Cash Flow:
P
Port Irperial
West New York, New Jersey
Exhibit 10 BEFORE-TRX DISCOUNTED CASH FLOW ANALYSIS
OTR: 89/1 89/2 89/3 89/4 90/1 90/2 90/3 90/4 91/1 91/2
Condominiur CF (3,762,?27) (3,182,548) (2,590,902) (1,921,256)
Parking NOI (16,002) 6,123 28,848 51,273
Retail NOI 0 0 0 0
Net Cash Flow:
C4,332,000) (3,778,728) (3,176,121) (2,562,051) (1,872,983)
0 (3,7?8,?28) (3,176,121) (2,562,054) (1,872,983)
Before-Tax NPV 8 202 and IRR
(1,081,121)
3,250,879
6,623,571
79,07
0
16,109,036 1,880,782
102,623 116,825
0 0
6,702,647 16,511,659
6,702,61? 16,511,659
1,997,607
1,997,607
0
116,825
132,300
998,621
89,754
132,300
359,156
106,413
132,300
249,125 1,220,675 597,868
249,125 1,220,675 597,868
Curulati ve Cash Flow C39,030,568)(C2,206,692)(14,768,746)(16,641,728)C39,939,081)C23,127,121)C21,129,814)(21,180,689)(19,960,011)C19,362, 15)
-- - - - - - - - - - - - - ---- 
- - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - -
Land Loan
Land Loan 0. S. (750,000) (750,000) (750,000) (750,000)
Net Cash Flow:
(4,332,000) (4,528,728) (3,926,121) (3,312,054) (2,622,983)
0 (1,528,728) (3,926,124) (3,312,054) (2,622,983)
Before-Tax NPV 9 202 and IRR
10,171,875
11,803,8?5
(750,000) (?50,000) (750,000) (?50,000) (750,000) (750,000)
5,952,61? 15,761,659
5,952,61? 15,761,659
1,247,607
1,217,607
(500,875) 470,675 (152,132)
(500,875) 470,675 (152,132)
Cumulative Cash Flow (16,680,568)(20,606,692)(23,918,746)(26,541,728)(20,589,081) (4,827,421) (3,579,811) (4,080,689) (3,610,014) (3,762,145)
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OTR: 91/3 91/1 92/1 92/2 92/3 92/1 93/1 93/2 93/3 93/4
Condominium CF 359,156
Parking NOI 131,136
Retail NOI 132,300
Net Cash Flow:
(,332,000) 622,592
0 622,592
Before-Tax NPV 8 202 and IRR
(1,081,121)
3,250,879
359,156
155,859
132,300
12,016,309
192,161
132,300
11,695,470
221,720
132,300
0
221,720
132,300
0
221,720
132,300
3,263,207 1,010,125
231,281 252,618
132,300 132,300
1,010,125
279,905
132,300
9,198,182
307,163
160,963
617,315 12,371,073 12,019,190 351,020 354,020 3,629,788 1,395,373 1,122,631 9,666,308
617,315 12,371,073 12,019,190 351,020 351,020 3,629,788 1,395,373 1,122,631 9,666,308
Curulative Cash Flow C18,739,551)(18,092,239) (5,721,166) 6,328,324 6,682,315 ?,036,365 10,666,153 12,061,526 13,481,157 23,150,165
Land Loan
Land Loan 0. S. (750,000)
Net Cash Flow:
(1,332,000) (127,108)
0 (127,108)
Before-Tax HPV 8 202 and IRR
10,171,875
11,803,875
(?50,000) (?50,000) (750,000) (750,000) (?50,000) (750,000) (?50,000) (750,000) (750,000)
(102,685) 11,621,073
(102,685) 11,621,073
11,299,190
11,299,190
(395,980) (395,980) 2,879,788 645,373 672,631 8,916,308
(395,980) (395,980) 2,879,788 615,373 672,631 8,916,308
CIrUlative Cash Flow (3,889,551) (3,992,239) 7,628,834 18,928,321 18,532,315 18,136,365 21,016,153 21,661,526 22,331,157 31,250,165
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OTR: 91/1 94/2 91/3 94/4 95/1 95/2
Condominium CF 21,136,13? 3,402,561 7,893,943 1,287,22? 21,496,717 9,157,278
Parking NOI 355,113 3?3,?39 121,690 440,915 491,206 525,319
Retail NOI 160,963 160,963 191,710 191,710 191,110 191,710
Met Cash Flow:
(1,332,000) 21,952,211
0 21,952,214
Before-Tax NPV 0 202 and IRR
(1,081,121)
3,250,879
3,931,261 8,501,313 1,919,913 22,185,633 10,11,33?
3,937,261 8,50?,313 1,919,913 22,185,633 10,171,337
Curulative Cash Flow 15,102,618 19,039,912 57,51,285 62,161,198 81,652,830 95,121,168
Land Loan (30,000,000)
Land Loan 0. S. (?50,000) (?50,000) (?50,000) (750,000) (150,000) (?50,000)
Net Cash Flow:
(4,332,000) 21,202,211
0 21,202,211
Before-Tax NPV 0 20 and IRR
10, 471, 815
14,803,875
3,187,264 7,757,313 4,169,913 21,135,633 (20,275,663)
3,187,261 ?,757,343 1,169,913 21,435,633 (20,275,663)
Cumulative Cash Flow 52,452,678 55,639,912 63,391,285 67,567,198 89,002,830 68,727,168
p
